CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

The Directorate of Intelligence Historical Series

National Intelligence Survey Program 1948–1968

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OFFICE OF BASIC AND GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
(OBGI)

History of the
National Intelligence Survey Program

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September 1969

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Foreword

This history of the National Intelligence Survey (NIS)
program covers the existence of the program from 1948 to 1968.
The paper also includes a brief summary of the first interdepart-
mental basic intelligence program, the Joint Army Navy Intelligence
Studies (JANIS) developed during World War II to fulfill the
need of the United States for an adequate, coordinated digest
of strategic basic intelligence. The history therefore covers
25 years of the production of high-level basic intelligence by
the United States.

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THE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PROGRAM

I. The NIS Concept

A. Introduction

In general, the intelligence presented in the National
Intelligence Survey (NIS) in 1968 is concerned with the fundamental
characteristics, relatively unchanging natural features, and basic
resources of a foreign country. The NIS covers, to the extent
pertinent, the geographic, transportation, telecommunications,
sociological, political, economic, scientific, and military aspects
of the country or area; and, on a worldwide basis, it deals with
oceanography.

The NIS is a digest of basic intelligence, comprehensive in
scope but selective in detail, required as a foundation for
strategic planning, for high-level operational planning, and for
development of foreign policy. It is produced on a coordinated,
interdepartmental basis and is designed to present a balanced,
well-rounded background to support planning by high-level
planners and policymakers and their staffs in the Department of
State, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), the military services and major military commands, and
other government agencies. Although not designed to meet their

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specialized needs, the NIS is generally useful to lower level planners and operational elements as well.

Production for the NIS Program requires a continuous overall collection effort covering all foreign countries and areas. The intelligence data resulting from this collection and subsequent processing necessarily are more comprehensive and detailed than those appearing in the printed NIS and constitute a reservoir of information which serves as a basis for separate supplemental, departmental, and interdepartmental basic intelligence production.

B. Origins

During World War II it was realized that the production of basic intelligence by various components of the government was resulting in great duplication of effort. Geographic studies of foreign areas were being produced by G-2, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In addition to duplication, there were many conflicting statements in the studies produced. In 1943, General George B. Strong (G-2), Admiral H. C. Train (ONI), and General William J. Donovan (Director of OSS) decided that some joint effort should be substituted for the duplication in previous publications, the Strategic Surveys of G-2, the Monographs of ONI, and the Topographic Intelligence Studies of OSS. A steering

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committee was appointed on 27 April 1943, composed of Colonel

Joseph Evans (G-2), Lieutenant Colonel Richard Cutts (ONI),

and Dr. Richard Hartshorne (OSS). The committee recommended

the formation of a Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board

(JISPB) to publish Joint Army Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS).[1]

1. JANIS

The JANIS served much the same purpose as the previously

published Army and Navy studies. The material in the JANIS chapters

was contributed by the several departments participating in the

JISPB. By the 27 April agreement, the JISPB was accorded

comprehensive responsibility for assembling, editing, coordinating,

and publishing the studies.

Between April 1943 and July 1947, the JISPB published some 34

complete or partial Joint Army Navy Intelligence Studies, chiefly

related to the Far East rather than to the European Theater of War.[2]

Arrangements had been made with the Inter-Service Topographical

Department (ISTD), which produced the Inter-Service Information

Series (ISIS), the British counterpart of JANIS, to avoid

duplication by having ISTD responsible for Europe and Africa and

the JANIS program for the Far East.[3] All evidence points to the

value of JANIS in the war effort. Some 20 studies were produced

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during the war and distributed widely throughout the theaters of
operation. Numerous letters of commendation were received,
including a statement from Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Staff,
Pacific Ocean Areas, that ''JANIS has become the indispensable
reference work for the shore-based planners.''

When hostilities ended, the JANIS program was continued
tentatively as an activity that could well be retained in time
of peace, given appropriate placement within the government. It
was obvious from the beginning that the newly authorized Central
Intelligence Group (CIG) could provide such placement. On 12
March 1946, Mr. Alfred McCormack, as Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Intelligence, stated in the course of a
memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence (Admiral
Sidney W. Souers):

> As the participants in the JISPB now include agencies
> other than the Armed Services, its activities appear to fall
> within the scope of the National Intelligence Authority and
> it is believed that coordination of its work would be more
> effective if performed under the auspices of the Director of
> Central Intelligence.[4]

In response to Mr. McCormack's suggestion, Admiral Souers issued
a ''CIG Directive'' on 20 April 1946 (with the concurrence of the
Intelligence Advisory Board) which instructed the CIG Central
Planning Staff to study the organization and function of the

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JISPB in order to ''determine whether any change in the supervision and control of the Board was advisable, and if a change is recommended, how the interest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff might be properly safeguarded.''[5]

Following the studies produced by the staff, the Director of Central Intelligence agreed to assume operational responsibility for JANIS and the JISPB effective 1 October 1947.[6]

2. Early Postwar Basic Intelligence

During the early postwar period production of basic intelligence continued. The work on various JANIS projects was continued prior to the transfer of this program to Central Intelligence, and additional studies were produced under the supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) while a program for the production of the National Intelligence Surveys was being developed.

The CIG had anticipated the continuing production of basic intelligence by setting up, in early 1947, a basic intelligence unit within the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) ''with a view to the NIS program.''[7]

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The War Department had also produced early basic intelligence in Strategic Intelligence Digests (SID). In early 1946, work on an extensive survey of the U.S.S.R. was begun under the code name ''Defense Project.'' The task was soon found to be too comprehensive for a single agency, and in May 1946 the War Department suggested that CIG ''sponsor'' it. The Director of Central Intelligence agreed to this and appointed a coordinator from CIG to work with two joint committees that had been appointed to supervise the ''Project.''8 The SID program was transferred to ORE in 1947 when the CIA took over the JANIS program. The ''Defense Project'' on the U.S.S.R. continued under the coordination of the Basic Intelligence group and was published in 1948 as a three-volume Strategic Intelligence Digest on the U.S.S.R.9

With both the JANIS and SID programs under Central Intelligence direction, all of the work on basic intelligence was placed under the Basic Intelligence group within ORE. While coordinating the existing basic intelligence programs, the primary concern of the Basic Intelligence group was development of concepts to be incorporated in the National Intelligence Surveys. Captain Kenneth A. Knowles, USN, was appointed chief of these activities in 1947 and remained in this capacity until he retired in December 1962. This continuity in leadership, unusual in the early development of Central Intelligence, accounts in part for the continuity of progress in the development of the NIS Program.

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3. NSCID No. 3

On 13 January 1948 the National Security Council issued
Intelligence Directive No. 3, which officially authorized the
production of the National Intelligence Surveys. On 13 December
1948 the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) unanimously approved
the Basic Intelligence group's Standard Instructions, which contained
the NIS Outline and the Tentative Allocation of Production
Responsibility. The Committee recommended that the National
Security Council approve the document, and on 28 December the
Council's Acting Executive Secretary advised the Director of Central
Intelligence that the National Security Council had approved the
Standard Instructions.

C. The Grand Design

The NIS Program developed out of the situation prevailing at
the end of World War II. During the war the JANIS program had
been initiated to fill the need for coordinated and accurate basic
intelligence. As the war drew to an end, it became apparent that
such intelligence, even broader in scope, would be needed in times
of peace.

This need for more comprehensive intelligence in peacetime
was well expressed by George Pettee in 1946, as follows:[10]

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Just as air war requires vastly more complex intelligence
than ground war, so also world leadership in peace requires
more elaborate intelligence than air war...the conduct of
peace involves all countries, all human activities--not just
the enemy and his war production.

Among others thinking and writing about the problems of

peacetime intelligence needs was Sherman Kent, who enumerated

the three basic forms of strategic intelligence that would be

required:[11] "the basic descriptive form, the current reportorial

form, and the speculative-evaluative form." Kent went on to point

out the importance of basic intelligence:[12]

The descriptive element of strategic intelligence is basic
to the other two....It is the groundwork which gives meaning
to day-to-day change and the groundwork without which speculation
into the future is likely to be meaningless.

The centralization of the production of basic intelligence in

the Basic Intelligence group of CIA provided a means of utilizing

the specialized capabilities of the various government agencies.

A comprehensive program was developed which involved three

basic concepts:[13]

a. The NIS would require an "across the board" collection
    program covering all important foreign countries and areas
    of the world simultaneously.

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b. The NIS would be a production and maintenance program, based on the above premise and JCS priorities and carried out in accordance with intelligence agency capabilities.

c. The NIS would be a concise digest of basic intelligence required by the DoD for strategic planning and high-level operational planning, and by the Department of State for use in formulating and executing foreign policy.

In support of the first concept, each of the intelligence agencies agreed to survey intelligence information relating to its responsibilities under the NIS Program to determine what major gaps existed and to take active steps to fill these gaps by early collection efforts.

In respect to the second concept, initial emphasis was to be given to production of the NIS. However, it was realized that the maintenance of the published NIS would progressively attain increasing importance. Effective maintenance would insure accurate, up-to-date basic intelligence.

The third concept defined in broad terms the degree of detail that would be included in the general NIS. While the NIS might satisfy many operational requirements, there would be a limit to the amount of detail that could be published and kept up to date on a maintenance basis. World War II experience had shown that complete coverage of all that might be desired required extensive time and effort, the accumulation of more data than available space

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could accommodate, and the expenditure of more funds than were available; such an end product would be so voluminous that no one would have the patience to read it.

The solution to this problem in the NIS Program was to assign to each of the intelligence agencies the responsibility for maintaining the detailed intelligence in its files so as to permit its ready publication in case of sudden demand. The details also would be needed in developing the broader aspects of the NIS and would be constantly needed to satisfy departmental requirements.

The requirements for the NIS as developed in the original outlines in the Standard Instructions were broken down into 10 categories or chapters:

Chapter I - Brief (a succint summary of the basic intelligence aspects of the NIS Area as a whole). This chapter would be of considerable value to such groups as the Joint Staff for strategic planning purposes.

Chapter II - Military Geography

Chapter III - Transportation and Telecommunications

Chapter IV - Sociological, including Health and Sanitation

Chapter V - Political

Chapter VI - Economic

Chapter VII - Scientific

Chapter VIII - Armed Forces

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Chapter IX - Map and Chart Appraisal

Gazetteer - a selected list of official geographic names
with their geographic coordinates

Certain topics involving more extensive detail would be

given expanded treatment in NIS supplements. For production

purposes, 103 NIS Areas were set up

(b)(3) NatSecAct

To discharge these responsibilities within CIA a National

Intelligence Survey unit (later renamed Basic Intelligence unit)

was organized under the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates.

The new unit incorporated the basic group which had been developing

the NIS Program.

Two other requirements for the production of the NIS were

uniform base maps and standardized geographic names. All contributors

would be able to utilize standardized NIS base maps, for any NIS

Area, in order to present needed graphic information on such topics

as topographic features, transportation networks, or political

subdivisions. The base map was thus a standard reference medium

of uniform size and projection which would serve to integrate the

graphic data of the entire NIS. The use of standard geographic

names would eliminate ambiguity and confusion in the intelligence

produced. The Cartography Branch of ORE was to produce base maps

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for all contributing agencies. CIA would provide financial support for an extensive program to develop NIS gazetteers containing officially approved geographic names under the direction of the United States Board on Geographic Names.

The printing of the National Intelligence Surveys was to be provided by a special unit of the Government Printing Office (GPO) called the State Services Office, located in the CIA area; it was to operate in accordance with CIA security requirements and with the CIA underwriting the cost of this work.

The function of the NIS Program was not confined to the published Surveys. In addition to these valuable end products, the data acquired and the experience gained in their production were to become significant aspects of the program. The preparation of the NIS involved a fundamental change in the whole intelligence structure. The foundation of the structure was basic intelligence without which no sound national intelligence estimates would be possible. The field of basic intelligence had been organized into a single program in which each intelligence agency had a definite area of responsibility concerned with intelligence collection, file maintenance, and NIS production. This organization insured a minimum of duplication and deficiency, and assigned to each agency tasks for which it was best suited. Also, in reviewing and editing the NIS, the intelligence agencies would develop definite

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standards by which they could measure the quality of their

own intelligence. The use by all the agencies of uniform requirements

set forth in the NIS Outline Guide would provide a logical approach

to a hitherto chaotic situation.

Such was the grand design for the National Intelligence Survey

Program. Most of these planned improvements in intelligence

production have been realized over the last 20 years in which the

NIS Program has been in operation, although there have been many

problems to overcome and the breadth of scope has had to be reduced

as the program has evolved.

D. Allocation of Responsibility

1. Organization

The organization that was set up to implement the NIS Program

was based on the principle of decentralization of responsibilities

for collection, file maintenance, and production. Control of the

earlier JANIS program had been highly centralized. A large central

staff was required to deal directly with each producing component

at the working level and to bypass the control levels in each agency.

While having certain advantages, this system was not considered

practical for the NIS Program. Different arrangements for control

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and coordination in State, Army, Navy, and Air Force characterized each agency's NIS activities. Representatives of the control levels of each agency served on an interagency NIS Committee which set the policy and approved the requirements for the program. These same individuals served as NIS Coordinators within their own agencies to implement decisions agreed upon by the Committee, thus insuring better understanding and communitywide coordination of the overall program. The principal supervisor of CIA's Basic Intelligence activities acted as NIS Coordinator for the entire program, and the personnel of his staff provided communitywide guidance and advisory support in the production of manuscript and graphics. The organization thus permitted some flexibility and placed considerable responsibility on each participating agency for insuring that NIS contributions were adequately produced, carefully reviewed, and properly coordinated before transmittal to CIA. In substance, this system remains intact today.

2. NIS Committee

The Ad Hoc Committee, which was appointed by the IAC to formulate the NIS Program pursuant to NSCID No. 3, recommended the establishment of a permanent NIS Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee's final report of 4 March 1948 was subsequently approved by the IAC and the National Security Council.

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The functions of the NIS Committee, as established by the
Standard Instructions approved on 28 December 1948, are as follows:

a. Considers and recommends for approval of the intelligence
agencies the overall policies of the NIS Program.

b. Determines the scope and treatment of each NIS to be produced.

c. Allocates the responsibility for production and maintenance
of the NIS Program in accordance with the intelligence
requirements, production capabilities, and dominant interests
of the intelligence agencies concerned.

d. Establishes NIS production and maintenance schedules based
upon JCS priorities and agency capabilities.

e. Promulgates procedures and instructions for the preparation,
review, editing, and submission of NIS contributions.

f. Recommends to CIA measures necessary for the coordination
of the NIS Program.

The NIS Committee, the first of the IAC Committees, first met
on 25 June 1948.[14] From the outset it was to play a key role in
the program. Its members, as envisioned in the Ad Hoc Committee's
recommendations, were to be direct representatives of their
respective chiefs of intelligence who could speak authoritatively
for them and in turn keep them personally informed on NIS matters.
During the first years this arrangement was not fully realized and,
in consequence, the NIS Committee members were frequently handicapped
by the positions they occupied within their own intelligence
organizations.

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Support for the Committee members grew, however, and as the mechanism was being created for continued support, substantial improvements were made. The ''two-hat'' system used in the Committee, whereby the representatives of the intelligence agencies also directed the implementation of the program within their respective agencies, became increasingly effective in strengthening the control and coordination of the program. The principle of unanimity in committee action developed and has done much to cement interagency relations and to make the NIS Program a joint effort.

3. Role of CIA

In addition to establishing the responsibilities of the intelligence agencies concerned with the NIS Program, units had to be set up to implement the responsibilities of CIA for coordinating, reviewing, editing, publishing, and disseminating the NIS. The principal unit so organized was the Basic Intelligence group, which was supported by the regional branches of ORE for substantive review. The other units were the Geographic Branch of ORE, responsible for the coordination of Chapter IX; the Map Branch of ORE, for central cartographic services; and a special GPO unit, the State Services Office, for printing. This last unit was not a component of CIA but operated under its general supervision through the CIA Services Officer.

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Placement of the basic intelligence function within ORE was

almost inevitable, since this was the center for research and

substantive coordination of intelligence for the Agency. It was

also contemplated that the producing components of ORE would

provide substantive review of completed NIS. During 1947-50,

ORE's Basic Intelligence organization might have become diverted

from its main effort to various other tasks, but this did not

happen and it became an independent unit which looked to ORE

mainly for administrative support.

The augmentation of the Basic Intelligence unit was a central

problem during the first year of operation and would have become

a serious bottleneck in NIS production had it not been for the

general failure among the contributing agencies to meet the

schedule. During the first year the Basic Intelligence unit devoted

much of its time to matters of coordination, principally instituting

common procedures, indoctrinating personnel of the contributing

agencies through numerous working level conferences, and

straightening out the numerous kinks in the chain.

The reorganization within CIA in October 1950 did not

seriously affect the Basic Intelligence unit; indeed, the

Coordinator's report covering the last half of 1950 and the first

half of 1951 did not allude to the change.[15]

the original organizational charter of General Walter Bedell   (b)(3) NatSecAct

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Smith's administration, showed ''Basic Intelligence'' as one of

six divisions under the Assistant Director for the Office of

Research and Reports (ORR), replacing ORE, and directed ORR to

''Provide for centralized allocation and coordination of the National

Intelligence Survey Program.'' This had always been the function

of the Basic Intelligence unit, and it was one that could doubtless

be performed under any administrative organization within CIA as

long as the underlying NIS agreements remained in force.

Placement of the Basic Intelligence unit in ORR was in part

the outgrowth of a recommendation made in the Dulles Report. This

report, although it commented on the unit at some length, made no

recommendation for its disposal, implying that the problem should

be considered by the proposed ''Coordination Division'' of CIA as

part of its ''...responsibility for studying the actual scope of

the Research and Reports Division and for recommending those

services of common concern which should be performed centrally.''

Nothing in the Dulles Report was in conflict with the solution

adopted in 1950.[16]

The NIS Program, however, was not a function that should

necessarily be placed within the Office of Research and Reports,

which was concerned primarily with geographic and economic

intelligence. Either the Office of National Estimates or the Office

of Intelligence Coordination might well have provided a logical

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headquarters for this highly coordinative enterprise. ''Basic

Intelligence,'' as defined in NSCID No. 3, was a form of national

intelligence to be produced for, and under the immediate approval

of, the National Security Council. Thus, it was in the same category

as current intelligence (under OCI), crisis intelligence (under the

IAC Watch Committee), or estimative intelligence (under the IAC

through ONE); but it was not in the same category as economic

intelligence, which was only a subdivision of the national

intelligence responsibility as a whole. This fundamental discrepancy

made the placement of the NIS within ORR questionable as a

permanent arrangement.

In August 1955 the Basic Intelligence Division of ORR was

abolished, and basic intelligence operations were transferred

to the newly established Office of Basic Intelligence (OBI). The

principal impetus for this logical change came from the very

favorable commendation of the NIS Program turned in by the Clark

Committee of the Hoover Commission. The Clark investigation had

stated that:

> ...the National Intelligence Survey is an invaluable
> publication which provides the essential elements of basic
> intelligence on all areas of the world. While its production
> involves an extensive and expensive effort, all members of the
> Intelligence Community derive an immediate benefit from the
> contributions they make to it, and profit from the final product.
> There will always be a continuing requirement for keeping the
> survey up to date.[17]

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In the reorganization of 1950 the Basic Intelligence Division of ORR was divided into three branches--Editorial, Regional Review, and Publication--under the direction of Captain Kenneth Knowles, USN (Ret.). Five years later, when OBI was established, Captain Knowles became its Assistant Director (AD/OBI) and Colonel Roy H. Boberg, USAF (Ret.), its Deputy AD. With the creation of a separate Office of Basic Intelligence the organization remained much the same except that the branches were reclassified as divisions.

The Editorial Branch, the largest component of OBI, was charged with the responsibility for final correlation, review, and editing of NIS material and for providing advice and instruction to the producing agencies. The branch was subdivided into five functional units: Geographic, Economic, Transportation and Telecommunications, Political and Sociological, and Military and Scientific. Members of the branch negotiated directly with the NIS contributors. After contributions were reviewed, guidance in the form of ''worknotes'' was sent to the producers so that, where necessary, the material could be reworked in accordance with NIS standards of coverage, accuracy, form, and style.[18]

Editorial responsibility for the entire NIS output was distributed within the branch as follows:

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a. The Deputy Chief was responsible for Chapter I[19] (Brief) and the Key Personalities.

b. The Geographic unit, for Chapter II and the Special NIS on Marine Climate and Oceanography.

c. The Transportation and Telecommunications unit, for Chapter III.

d. The Political and Sociological unit, for Chapters IV and V.

e. The Economic unit, for Chapter VI.

f. The Military and Scientific unit, for Chapters VII, VIII, and IX.

The Regional Branch was charged with overall surveillance of the NIS from the regional, as distinct from the functional, point of view. The Regional Branch had no subdivisions and consisted of a chief and [   ] senior, professional analysts who were responsible for Western Europe, the Soviet bloc, the Far East, the Middle East and Africa, and Latin America. The analysts fulfilled their mission by performing the following duties from the regional point of view:

a. Reviewing incoming NIS contributions for accuracy and adequacy.

b. Coordinating incoming contributions with pertinent published elements of the NIS.

c. Keeping informed of situations and conditions of basic intelligence significance in foreign countries.

d. Recommending, when appropriate, revision of NIS elements under the maintenance program.

e. Furnishing guidance for balance and emphasis in NIS Chapter I.[20]

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The Publication Branch consisted of two units—the Review unit, which was concerned with the publication editing of the manuscript and the Production unit, which had the responsibility for correcting and coordinating all maps and graphics.

The main responsibilities of the Branch were to—

a. Provide guidance to NIS contributors in all map and graphic work.

b. Schedule and review the base maps and gazetteers.

c. Establish the format, correlate the manuscript and graphics, and prepare the section for printing.

d. Disseminate the published NIS sections and gazetteers.

The printing of the NIS was the responsibility of the State Services Office of the GPO, located in the CIA area.

The organization continued without major change between 1955, when OBI was established, and 1960. Subsequent changes are covered in the pertinent subsections of this history.

E. Establishment of Priorities

Even before the NIS Committee was formed, the Ad Hoc Committee had proposed that NIS production be scheduled in accordance with

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JCS priorities. The JCS concurred and provided lists showing

priority requirements.21

As the NIS Program developed, the priority lists were revised

from time to time to meet current requirements. The lists submitted

by the contributors were evaluated by the NIS Committee, and

production was scheduled consistent with agency capabilities and

in accordance with the priorities established.

The priority lists were divided into three categories:

a. NIS Areas of high priority.

b. NIS Areas of moderate priority.

c. NIS Areas of low priority (areas in which there were
   no JCS requirements at the time).

Further guidance was provided for NIS production by information

on:

a. NIS completion dates necessary to meet established
   Joint Staff commitments.

b. Any particular chapters of certain NIS for which special
   priority was desired.

c. Any other requirements of the Joint Staff which should
   receive special attention.

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This system of establishing priorities continued until 1963 when a new system was devised (covered in Section V, I, 3).

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II. Developing a Viable Program

A. First-Year Mission

The schedule worked out for the first year (FY49) of the
NIS called for the production of 456 sections, or the equivalent
of 6 complete NIS.[22] It had been conjectured that the production
of 6 NIS for FY49 and of 15 NIS each year thereafter
would fulfill the desired completion of all NIS on areas
of high priority by 30 June 1952. However, certain sections
were not relevant to the areas under consideration and others
were consolidated for more effective treatment. Revisions of the
production schedule during the year reduced the first year's
requirements to 303 sections. The agencies responsible for production
expected that their capabilities would permit the attainment
of the production schedule, as had been planned originally, if
the requested funds and personnel were made available.

The Annual Report for FY49 was prepared in advance (25
May 1949) of the end of the fiscal year to inform higher authorities
of the problems of the first year's experience. Up to 25 May only
89 sections had been submitted of the 303 required by the revised
schedule. Of these 89 only 50% were adequate.[23] The deficiencies
were partly due to a failure to conform to the NIS Outlines or format.

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The principal and most disturbing deficiencies, however, were
fundamental errors and inconsistencies in the text, which while
not necessarily significant in each case, collectively jeopardized
the general credibility of the intelligence. The difficulties
encountered during the first year delayed processing, with the
result that no NIS sections were published during FY49.24

Work on basic intelligence did not stop, however, during this
early period. Several partially completed JANIS were completed,
and the ''Defense Project,'' which had been taken over from the
War Department, was finished under the coordination of the Basic
Intelligence unit and was issued in three volumes as the Strategic
Intelligence Digest (SID) on the U.S.S.R.

B.   Inauguration of the NIS Base Map and Gazetteer Programs

Before adequate NIS sections could be produced, it was
necessary to develop base maps and gazetteers for the use of
contributing agencies. Unfortunately, the initiation of these
projects was coincident with the beginning of NIS production.
To satisfy the requirements of contributing agencies, interim
procedures and heavy workloads became necessary in the Map
Branch, ORE, which produced the base maps, and in the Office of
Geography, Department of the Interior, which was responsible for

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compiling standard geographic names for the gazetteers. Base maps

and gazetteers were required for an accurate presentation of

intelligence in the NIS, and they became important in other fields

as well. The concept of the NIS base map program was to produce

a comprehensive coverage of all foreign countries and areas by

a series of maps with excellent characteristics of scale, projection,

and data for general intelligence use.

The inherent advantages of the NIS Program were clearly

illustrated in the NIS gazetteers. The geographic name situation

had long been one of confusion and lack of organization. No

official gazetteer worthy of the name had been published, and no

two commercial gazetteers were in more than superficial agreement.

Confusion in this field had increased after World War II because

of the worldwide dislocation of national boundaries and changes

in national sovereignty. Although the Board on Geographic Names had

a continuing responsibility for compiling official geographic names

for use by the government, adequate funds had never been appropriated

for this purpose. Such financial support as was forthcoming from

other government agencies did not permit a logical or comprehensive

approach to the problem. However, the funds provided by CIA under

the NIS Program, together with IBM collation and reproduction

facilities in what was then OCD/CIA made possible an effective means

of solving the problem. Reflecting an inadequate research base,

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and the necessity for an initial rapid production, the first published
gazetteers were designated as Preliminary NIS Gazetteers. The
primary purpose was to provide standardized geographic names for
the NIS.

The production of base maps and gazetteers in the first year
achieved satisfactory levels in spite of the many difficulties
encountered. It was accomplished by the exceptional efforts of
the Map Branch of the Geographic Division, ORE, and the Office of
Geography in the Department of Interior. The cooperation of the
various contributors in adjusting their schedules for the optimum
use of base map production, and the assistance of the Intelligence
Divison, WDGS, U.S. Army, in producing certain base maps were
particularly helpful. During FY49, 39 base maps covering 17
NIS Areas were prepared, and 6 gazetteers were produced--including
the gazetteer for the U.S.S.R., which in this preliminary version
contained 110,000 geographic names.[25]

C. Emphasis on Quality and the Role of Substantive Review

The fundamental errors and inconsistencies of the text in
over half the contributions received during the first year
were disturbing. Less than 50% of the contributions were considered
qualitatively adequate even with normal editing to meet minimum

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satisfactory NIS requirements. In terms of both substance and
presentation not more than 25% would have been acceptable had not
editorial standards been heavily weighted by the long-range
perspective and the necessity for getting on with the broad program.
Considerable effort had been expended in compiling most contributions,
but they had not been adequately reviewed or correlated into a
well-knit presentation. The effect was to reduce materially the
rate of NIS production and to place upon the Basic Intelligence
group a disproportionately heavy workload. This problem of quality
control was destined to be prolonged.

Another serious problem was the uneven flow of contributions.
Near the end of FY49 only 89 of the 303 scheduled sections had
been received. A heavy load of sections submitted at the close
of the fiscal year resulted in a serious backlog of material to
be processed. This production pattern was to become an aggravated
problem for many years. It created problems in the contributing
agencies and in the Basic Intelligence unit in CIA. The review
staffs in the agencies were forced to work long hours under pressure
to process the mass of material to meet the yearend deadline, with
the inevitable result that the quality of the contributions suffered
and the processing burden increased correspondingly. This serious
backlog problem was partially alleviated in the middle 1960's
through more efficient scheduling, but it continues at a reduced
level today.

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D. Emerging Problems

The reasons for the qualitative and quantitative deficiencies
in NIS production during the first year can be quite accurately
appraised. First, the various agencies overestimated their
production capabilities. This might have been because, in large
part, they did not fully appreciate the disparity in requirements
for quality and comprehensiveness between the NIS and other basic
intelligence studies with which they were familiar. There was
also an initial inadequacy of measures to accomplish a realignment
of effort. This, of course, was inherently linked with the
overestimation of capabilities. These failures were compounded
by restrictions on available funds, personnel ceilings, and the
difficulty of procuring qualified personnel. But more than all
of these things, perhaps the most difficult obstacle to early
success was the failure to indoctrinate all echelons in the
concept, implications, and modus operandi of the NIS Program.
Prior to its implementation, several of the agencies had produced
basic intelligence generally similar to, but with lower quality
requirements and less comprehensiveness than, the NIS. It naturally
followed that the substantive review of NIS material by contributing
agencies was inadequate.

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With the poor NIS production record of the first year it became apparent that a reexamination was necessary. In September 1949, the Director of Central Intelligence invited attention to the production deficiencies in the program and requested the participating members in the Department of Defense to indicate their capabilities for meeting the NIS commitments in view of actual or prospective cuts in the appropriations and personnel of the military services.26 The Intelligence Bureau of the Department of State was not concerned in this matter because it was financed by the CIA in meeting its production responsibilities under the NIS Program.

Replies from the participating members indicated that the Navy and Air Force could meet NIS requirements and that the Army could meet approximately the equivalent of 8 NIS per year rather than the 15 planned. Since the Army's responsibilities amounted to more than 40% of the program, it was evident that the JCS requirements were considerably in excess of existing capabilities. In December 1949, the DCI requested that the Joint Staff reexamine its requirements for the NIS and advise him of any change in the priority list of NIS Areas and in the related rate of production.27 As a result, the Joint Staff reduced the requirements—not on the basis of national strategic interests but rather on the capabilities of the producing agencies to meet the equivalent of 8 NIS per year.

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The problems that beset the NIS Program during the first year were, of course, to be expected. In some measure they were indicative of difficulties which would confound the program for many years and, although to a lesser degree, remain even today. The deficiencies were fundamental, extending down to the intelligence analysts who prepared the contributions. The various contributors were not adequately supporting the program, all too frequently allowing departmental requirements to take precedence over scheduled NIS work to which they were committed. This resulted in an imbalance in the production schedules. This difficulty existed because the same personnel used for NIS work were also used for departmental activities. As long ago as 1950, in the second Annual Report, the NIS Committee Chairman stated:

> The Ad Hoc Committee which developed the fundamental aspects of the NIS Program recommended that the NIS on all areas of high priority should be completed and placed on a maintenance basis by 30 June 1952. This date was concurred in by the Joint Staff and the NSC. The present rate of production will attain this objective some five years later, or 1957. Perhaps that is the best we can do under the circumstances, but, in view of the present world situation, this matter deserves serious consideration at the policy level.[28]

Apparently, it was not in the nature of things that the NIS was to receive this high-level consideration.

In citing the difficulties of the first year of the NIS Program this analysis should not overlook the amount of progress achieved.

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A concept, a plan, and an organization had been developed which were fundamentally sound and practical and which provided a means for the eventual acquisition, production, and maintenance of adequate basic intelligence to meet the requirements of the government. Valuable training, experience, and understanding were gained. All of these formed a basis for further development of the program in subsequent years.

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III. Years of Turmoil, 1949-52

A. Impact of the Korean War

If the first year of the NIS Program was one of frustration, the second was one of despair. As indicated previously, the original requirement for an NIS production of the equivalent of 15 NIS a year was reduced to the equivalent of 8 per year in view of the lack of sufficient capabilities of the intelligence agencies of the armed forces. Even this reduced goal was not attained during FY50. Moreover, the quality of many contributions was deficient. Gaps remained in the basic intelligence which was published—indicating that a greater collection effort was needed.

The Korean war was beginning to have an impact on the program. The Office of Naval Intelligence gave formal notice that, because of the situation in the Far East, work on Navy commitments to the program would be suspended until further notice. NIS representatives from the Army and the Air Force informally indicated similar decisions regarding work on their commitments. Although the Office of Intelligence Research in the Department of State did not indicate that the Far Eastern problems would adversely affect work on Department of State commitments, the actions of the service intelligence agencies seriously impeded the NIS Program.

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In an August 1950 letter transmitting the Annual Report of

the NIS Program to all participants, the Director of Central.

Intelligence stated the case for increased attention to the NIS

Program:[29]

> The NIS Program is a long range project undertaken in
> accordance with NSCID No. 3 and is designed to produce all
> basic intelligence needed by the government. Such a program,
> in order to produce adequate basic intelligence, requires
> special machinery for control and coordination, extensive
> analytical research, and intensified collection and collation.
> Once these activities are interrupted they are difficult to
> set in motion again. Hence, if the program is to cover the
> high priority countries in a reasonable time, production must
> proceed in an orderly and continuous manner.
>
> Basic intelligence is so vital to planning that, if planners
> cannot obtain such intelligence from the NIS, they will obtain
> it by means of a swollen volume of ad hoc requests. The result
> is a disruption of the NIS Program, such as we are now
> experiencing which, if continued, will mean the reversion of
> basic intelligence to its highly unsatisfactory state existing
> at the beginning of World War II.
>
> Although comprehending fully the exigencies demanded by the
> requirements of the current situation, it is hoped that the
> NIS Program will receive a high priority and a high degree of
> interest from all the agencies in order that it may not die on
> the vine.

This strong statement of support for the NIS concept was

written in the face of some internal CIA doubts as to the practical

wisdom of attempting to carry on with the program. In a

hand-wringing memorandum to the Director,[30] the Chief of the

Coordination, Operations, and Policy Staff warned that in time of

war many other items had to take precedence over basic intelligence

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and that, in any case, the service agencies could not be made to stick to basic production if they preferred the current. He argued further that the agencies should be squarely confronted with the alternative of meeting their commitments or deciding to discontinue the program. In a statement suggesting that he may have been ahead of his time, he wondered whether the NIS could be produced by non-IAC agencies, the universities, and the geographic societies, omitting the Pentagon altogether—"with the military situation what it is, it may now be the time to change it to a more or less private research project."

On the other hand, those in CIA responsible for the NIS Program were urging specific measures to assure continued support for the program. Fearful that the downward revision of NIS requirements by the Joint Staff was based on the capabilities of producing agencies rather than on the actual need for basic intelligence, they recommended that reconsideration be given to a statement from the Joint Staff as to their minimum requirements without prejudice to the national security. They also recommended to the Director that the service intelligence agencies determine the precise capabilities they would need to meet the minimum requirements of the Joint Staff, and that they initiate appropriate action to obtain the requisite funds for the continuing support of these capabilities. The Director's letter, cited earlier, was essentially a compromise between these two positions.

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B. Production Record

Despite the difficulties, considerably more progress was

attained in the production of the NIS during FY50 than had

been realized during the first year. Contributors sent 398

NIS sections to CIA during the year (the equivalent of 6 1/2

NIS). These sections were on 40 individual NIS Areas, with the

largest block--34 sections---relating to the U.S.S.R. Of the

398 sections, 287 were reviewed and cleared for publication by

CIA, and 216 were printed and disseminated.31 While this

production was much higher than that of the first year, it

fell short of the hoped-for equivalent of 8 NIS sections (already

reduced from the original requirement of 15 per year).

The most disturbing defect in the contributions received

during the year, however, was the qualitative, not the quantitative,

deficiency. This resulted in much wasted effort on the part of

all processing and reviewing components and was the largest

single deterrent to production. Less than 35% of all contributions

reviewed by CIA during the year were adequate, with reasonable

editing, to meet the minimum NIS requirements. Materials submitted

for the NIS were divided into three qualitative categories:

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Category I—NIS material which fully satisfied the fundamental requirements of a well-prepared and well-coordinated basic intelligence study, including such essentials as sound research, clear presentation, and substantive accuracy.

Category II—NIS material which with reasonable editorial support by the Basic Intelligence unit, CIA, satisfied minimum NIS standards.

Category III—NIS material which did not satisfy minimum NIS standards without major revision.

More than 40% of FY50 contributions required extensive review and coordination with the contributors. The remainder required major reworking by the contributors before they could meet the minimum standards. The qualitative deficiencies were due principally to unrealistic production schedules, which overextended agency capabilities to such an extent that quality had to be sacrificed for quantity; inadequate review and coordination at the working and control level in the contributing agencies; and the inexperience and incompetence of many working-level analysts.

Those in CIA responsible for the NIS Program were determined to achieve the highest possible quality. Achievement of this goal was the greatest frustration in these early years, and it has continued to be a major problem with but varying degrees of alleviation over the subsequent years of NIS production.

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Deficiencies in material were only nominally chargeable to contributor unfamiliarity with the NIS format and general concepts regarding content. No sections were returned to contributors on the basis of poor style or failure to conform in detail to the NIS Outline. The deficiency which was pervasive and unacceptably time consuming for both the Basic Intelligence personnel and the contributors was elementary, essentially careless substantive errors in text, tabular data, and graphic material. Many of these were significant. Others, though not necessarily of individual significance, were cumulatively capable of jeopardizing the general credibility of the material. Another deficiency was excessive contributor reliance on relatively old material, much of which had previously been published. There was a related tendency to give preference to source material because it was ''intelligence,'' even if fragmentary and uncoordinated, without making a reasonable and constructive use of commercial sources such as well-established trade journals. Appropriate use of the latter would have given a more professional level of treatment to NIS contributions than the use of materials which had been prepared by nontechnical authors.

A system of production reporting was developed to help the NIS Coordinator keep track of the various phases of the complex production situation inherent in the NIS Program. It covered all

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phases of processing, review, and publication. Departing from the previous method of reporting only on the percent of a section completed, a process which relied on personal estimates and other variables, the new system was one of ''phase reporting'' in the production process. Five phases were involved, the first three of which indicated one-third, two-thirds, and final completion of the first drafts of contributors at the working level. The fourth and fifth phases indicated the completion of review and coordination in the parent agency. After contributions were received in CIA, a second set of phase reports indicated the progress of material to the final printing.

The average time required to process NIS material from its receipt in CIA to its publication was about 7 1/2 months for the 216 sections published in FY50. Processing delays in CIA were attributed first to qualitative inadequacies in the texts and graphics submitted to CIA and second to the major time lag in the GPO's State Services Office. Usually, 2 or 3 months elapsed between the date the page proofs were approved for final printing and the date of actual publication.

The third year of the NIS Program, FY51, was also a year of disappointments and setbacks, although some consolation was to be found in the development of procedures and increased coordination,

which seemed to indicate that a firm basic intelligence program was assured.

At the beginning of the year, NIS production appeared to be in a very favorable position.[32] Over 50 sections had been produced in the last month of FY50. However, the Korean war caused almost total stoppage of NIS production by the service agencies and a considerable reduction by the Department of State. This critical situation was brought to the attention of the DCI who, with concurrence of the IAC, transmitted a memorandum on 22 August 1950 to the Secretary of Defense which stated in part:

> The effect of such withdrawals of support, in an undertaking which is wholly dependent upon full collaborative joint effort for successful accomplishment, is practically to inactivate the NIS production program in its entirety.
>
> If the vital basic intelligence requirements of the Government are to be met, continuous fiscal support and stability of personnel and organization are imperative.

On 16 October 1950 the Secretary of Defense directed the Department of the Army to explore the problem with the other services and indicated that the services should attempt to make their contributions without adding to the current budgetary or personnel quotas assigned for intelligence duties. The services, however, found that additional funds and personnel would be required to meet their commitments under the NIS Program. The increased staffs

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were approved on 14 December 1950 by the Secretary of Defense, who stated in a memorandum of the same date to the DCI that the DoD

> ....recognizes the importance of maintaining the production of National Intelligence Surveys on a regular basis, undiminished by fluctuations in the world situation which result in heavy demands upon its intelligence agencies.

Unfortunately, however, in a letter to General Smith (DCI),33 General Marshall stated that ''it would be neither practical nor economical for such personnel to be employed as a separate group'' as the DCI had recommended. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense ''directed the military services to integrate them with present intelligence staffs, although indicating that their working time would be devoted primarily to the production of the National Intelligence Surveys.'' This of course led to the siphoning off of NIS producers to the more immediate tasks at hand.

Production goals for FY51 were the equivalent of eight complete NIS. Actual production on the other hand was about half that total. The low production was attributed mainly to the diversion of production effort arising out of the Korean war and to the difficulties in recruiting and training staffs for NIS work. Although the quality of contributions improved gradually, many were still inadequate and required considerable revision to meet the stringent NIS requirements.

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C. Progress of the Gazetteer and Base Map Schedules

The production picture for the NIS gazetteers was brighter,
with the schedule fully met in FY50. Over 150,000 geographic
names were processed—comprising 22 preliminary gazetteers.[34]
However, it was recognized that the gazetteers were indeed
preliminary, to meet the immediate needs of the NIS producers,
and that they would have to be revised and considerably expanded
as conditions permitted. At this early stage it was also planned
to extend the use of the gazetteers to other departments of the
government and eventually to make them available to the public
without attribution to the NIS Program.

Similarly, the NIS base map schedule was generally met during
FY50. Like the preliminary gazetteers, the base maps served
their purpose admirably, not only in terms of efficient centralization
of mapping services whereby all NIS contributors were supplied
with necessary maps but also in the general cartographic excellence
of the maps.

Further progress in the gazetteer and base map programs was
made in FY51, the only bright spots in an otherwise difficult
year for the NIS Program.[35] Some 14 preliminary gazetteers were
produced, containing a total of about 148,000 standard geographic
names. This total exceeded the planned production rate by nearly

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25%. The base map requirements for all NIS contributors were generally met throughout the year. The base maps, furthermore, were being increasingly used for general intelligence purposes and were being distributed to other government agencies as well.

D. Early Evidence of Flexibility

With the experience of only a year, the NIS Committee took a number of steps leading to overall improvement in policies, requirements, and procedures relating to the program. During the fall of 1949, the Committee appointed interagency subcommittees to review and revise all NIS chapter and supplement outline guides based on experience since the first ones had been formulated.[36] All outline guides except the guide for Chapter VII (Scientific) were revised. Also, indicative of what was to be a developing attitude, it was determined that rather than produce the Scientific Chapter across the board, production would be restricted to those countries which had actual competence or significant potential in the scientific field. Problems arising out of new requirements by the Navy, respecting intelligence on Marine Climate and Oceanography, led to a decision by the NIS Committee to produce five special NIS covering the ocean areas of the world.[37] Production responsibility was assigned to the Navy with assistance from the Air Force on the marine climate sections.

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E. Problem of Maintenance

As early as the FY50 Annual Report, the maintenance aspects

of the NIS Program were recognized and delineated. It was seen as

a problem which was certain to be of increasing concern as the

publication of the initial Surveys attained significant proportions.38

(Interestingly enough, this concern reflected an optimistic faith that

the program, beset by more than the usual trials, would be successful.)

The NIS Coordinator pointed out in his Annual Report that directly

related to the maintenance program was the collection effort

required to fill the gaps and refine the basic intelligence

contained in the original Surveys. As new information arrived in

response to NIS requirements, the intelligence agencies were urged

to assign a commensurate portion of their capabilities to keeping

up-to-date data in maintenance files and, when requested to do so,

to revise sections of the NIS already published. Particular

importance was attached to the collection and maintenance programs

in view of the many gaps in basic intelligence which had been

revealed in the NIS contributions reviewed during the first year

of the program.

The maintenance phase of the NIS Program actually got underway

experimentally in 1952, when 14 revisions of previously published

NIS were produced.39 An NIS Committee meeting on 11 December 1953,

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at the initiative of the Chairman, addressed itself to the importance

of determining a firm set of criteria for NIS sections in the

maintenance program. At a subsequent meeting the members agreed

that maintenance should be undertaken when a published section

had the following weaknesses:

a. Serious qualitative deficiencies.

b. Important intelligence gaps which subsequent collection
   effort had filled.

c. Failure to reflect the fundamental situation prevailing in
   the area.

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IV. Years of Progress, 1953-60

A. Overcoming Disruptions of the Korean War

In discussing the early years of the NIS Program the negative aspects have perhaps received the major emphasis. It was clearly a time of bitter frustration, when it sometimes seemed impossible to develop a viable program of basic intelligence production. Yet, all during this period slow progress was being made--progress on which it became possible to build.

Despite dramatic setbacks, the NIS Program was firmly supported by the intelligence agencies, and measures were underway to provide long-range, continuing development of basic intelligence. Among these were the establishment of permanent staffs in the contributing agencies, the augmentation of collection capabilities in the field of basic intelligence, and the general improvement in the effectiveness of interagency coordination. With respect to collection, for example, all the intelligence agencies required that their field personnel review published elements of the NIS and report necessary changes, additions, and corrections without delay. In the case of the Air Force, it was further required that Air Attachés write first drafts of all NIS requirements for which the Air Force had responsibility.

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During FY52 and FY53 attention was focused, to a large

extent, on efforts to overcome the serious disruptions in NIS

production resulting from the Korean war. Measures instituted to

bring production capabilities back to the required level were

vigorously implemented by all agencies participating in the

program, with the result that the production goal set by the JCS

was achieved in FY53. Although production for FY52 was still

short of the goal, it represented a 56% increase over the production

of the previous year and provided substantial evidence that

the contributing agencies were taking effective measures to

restore production capabilities.[40]

The performance of the NIS contributors during the 1952-53

period was especially noteworthy when viewed in the light of the

many additional production problems encountered and overcome.

During 1951, the Secretary of Defense had approved additional

funds and personnel for NIS activities to enable the Defense

agencies to fulfill their commitments under the program. FY52

had hardly begun when a subsequent directive from the Office of

the Secretary of Defense reduced personnel strength and permitted

no new hiring.[41]

Nevertheless, additional progress was made in the maintenance

phase of the program in FY53, when 29 sections were produced, a

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considerable increase over the initial year's (FY52) maintenance

production of 14 sections.

Production had been started on the Special NIS on Marine Climate

and Oceanography in FY51, and by the end of FY53 submissions of

this series to OBI had attained 36% completion.[42] An interesting

aspect of the production of these special NIS publications was the

issuance of a notice by the Navy that these NIS would supersede

the Submarine Guide and Target Folder Series, which were to be

discontinued.

Accompanying the increase in production by the contributing

agencies was a corresponding substantial increase in processing

by the Basic Intelligence unit of CIA. In FY52 the unit processed

for publication 36% more NIS material than it had processed in the

preceding year, and in FY53 the production rate increased to 46%

over FY52.[43] However, even these considerable increases fell short

of keeping pace with the upsurge in the production of the contributing

agencies. A backlog of NIS material awaiting processing grew to

serious proportions despite all efforts to bring Agency capabilities

realistically in line with the lead imposed by the volume and

substantive inadequacies of the contributions.

The development of this backlog of NIS material in the

regional-editorial-review stage had been foreseen, and efforts were

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made to avert it--both by augmentation of the staffs and by stressing

to the participating agencies the need for qualitative improvements

in their contributions. It had long been realized that when the

contributing agencies reached, and maintained, a steady rate of

production, the basic intelligence capabilities within CIA would

have to be increased in proportion--to assure timely processing of

the material. In recognition of this, an attempt was made in FY51

to provide for an increase in staff. This attempt failed, however,

as did another attempt made in the following year.

During this 2-year period the Basic Intelligence unit was

operating at an average of only 75% of its authorized strength.

This understaffing was the result of difficulty in obtaining

qualified personnel with the required area knowledge, as well as

the editorial and publications training needed, for the review,

guidance, and consultation inherent in the final processing of

NIS material. At the beginning of FY54 the Basic Intelligence

unit had almost a year's backlog of contributions awaiting processing.

By the end of that year this backlog had been so reduced that

material was being processed on a reasonably current basis. This

speedup in processing within the unit had both good and bad aspects.

The staff had been brought up to its authorized strength during

the year, procedures had been adjusted to obtain maximum production

with a minimum sacrifice of quality, and a heavy overtime work

schedule had been followed. The increase in strength was desirable, but the speedup in processing included a less thorough review than was necessary to insure quality. The increase in material flowing into and through Basic Intelligence also resulted in a buildup of sections at the GPO's State Services Office.

B. Refinements

1. The Outlines

A major development during FY55 was the inclusion of more comprehensive psychological warfare requirements in the sociological, political, and economic chapters of the NIS.[44] This reflected the

(b)(3) NatSecAct

as the first definitive expression of comprehensive psychological warfare requirements in terms of basic intelligence coverage.

A new biographic unit, designated "Key Personalities," was also developed in FY55 to provide a more nearly balanced treatment of biographic intelligence, which had been formerly included in individual chapters, and to provide a source usable for independent reference. Prominent among the biographies produced during the initial year of the project was one entitled "Soviet

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Personalities,'' which comprised more than 800 biographies.

The NIS Committee continued to emphasize refining and extending
the NIS requirements to meet the increasing needs for comprehensive
basic intelligence. During FY56, outlines were developed on
International Communism as an NIS supplement, covering detailed
Communist organizations and activities in each relevant area, and
a special NIS on the international Communist movement and front
organizations. Major revisions were also made in the NIS Outlines
for Chapter I (Brief), [(b)(3) NatSecAct] and
Section 35 (Ports and Naval Facilities) and its related Supplement I.

A new NIS unit, the Annex, was devised for dealing with special
NIS subareas.[45] Designed especially for the treatment of separate
entities within larger NIS Areas, the Annex was introduced by the
NIS Committee Chairman at a meeting on 28 June 1955. In actual
practice, Annexes were incorporated as supplements to the introductory
sections of the pertinent chapters on the larger areas. In the case
of Italy, for example, the Section 40 (Introduction) of Chapter IV
(Sociological) was followed by Section 40-X (Annex) entitled ''The
Holy See as a Religious Society.'' Similarly, the Section 50
(Introduction) of Chapter V (Political) was followed by Section
50-X entitled ''The Holy See as a Temporal Power.''

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Again, throughout FY59, the NIS devoted considerable attention to refining NIS requirements.[46] Those for Chapter VII (Scientific) and for Ocean Areas were completely revised to maintenance standards as were a number of topical requirements in other NIS chapters. The extensive requirements for Supplement V (Petroleum) were abandoned in favor of better integrated selective requirements in the Fuels and Power Section of the Economic Chapter.

As part of a continued effort of the NIS Committee to provide measures for efficient production, in FY60 a more flexible format was instituted for Key Personalities units on the larger NIS Areas.[47]

2. Chapter I

The initial philosophy of Chapter I (Brief) production for the NIS was that it could only follow upon production of Chapters II through IX on any given country. This idea was to change, but it meant that Chapter I's were not produced until FY54.[48] Their production met a long-felt requirement for a succinct intelligence summary for each NIS Area. (For further changes in the Chapter I concept see Section V, D.)

3. Experimentation with the Chapter I Annual

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The NIS Annual program, initially proposed in October 1957, was designed to meet an apparent need for interim updating of the Chapter I (Brief), the general summary of topical subjects covered in other chapters of the NIS on any specific area.[49] The Chapter I Annuals ultimately were not published ''annually,'' according to the original concept and as the name implied, but were instead scheduled selectively with respect to both Area and time. A yearly review of all published Chapters I was to be undertaken and Annuals were to be published for those Areas in which major changes had occurred, for which information had become available to fill major gaps, or both. A Chapter I Annual was also to be considered for scheduling in the case of any NIS Area for which no Chapter I maintenance was forecast. The format of the NIS Annual followed closely that of the Chapter I.

Following NIS Committee approval of a prototype in November 1957, pilot Annuals for Poland and India went into production and were published in May 1958.[50] Annuals were produced for 12 NIS Areas in FY59, 12 in FY60, and the number was reduced to 7 in FY61. After a total of 33 Annuals during the 4-year period, production was discontinued in FY62 to permit increased production of more comprehensive Chapter I coverage.

4. Procedures

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In 1954, as the result of rather consistent failure on the part of Department of the Army to meet scheduled production, the department reorganized its NIS coordination and production activities with a view to overcoming the recognized shortcomings. Further, at the request of the Army, action was taken by the NIS Committee to reallocate responsibilities for coordination and production of several NIS elements which would enable the Army to carry out more effectively its remaining responsibility in the program. In response to a request by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACSI), the NIS Committee relieved the Army of production responsibilities for Supplement III (Telecommunications) and reassigned the Chapter VIII (Armed Forces) coordination responsibility and Section 45 (Health and Sanitation) production responsibilities to other agencies.[51]

Similarly, NIS production difficulties in the Geography Division of the Geographic Area, ORR (D/GG), CIA, were partly caused by delays inherent in the coordination of a jointly produced element such as the NIS Chapter IX, Map and Chart Appraisal. In 1954, a Chapter IX coordination staff was set up with responsibility for expediting the coordination of finished drafts with the various contributors to this chapter. The Chapter IX outline was also revised to simplify preparation of the map and chart elements.[52]

A change of procedures was also effected in the reallocation of the production responsibilities for portions of the NIS Chapter VI (Economic) that covered the Soviet bloc areas. These, formerly allocated to the Departments of State, Agriculture, and Interior, were transferred to ORR of CIA as of 1 July 1954.[53]

During the same year the coordination responsibility for Section 45 (Health and Sanitation) was reassigned from the Department of the Army to the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) of CIA; that office was also allocated the major responsibility for production of this section--to take effect in FY55.[54]

During FY55 the serious bottleneck in the processing and publication of NIS materials noted in previous years was largely overcome. As a consequence, the average time between the receipt of contributions in OBI and their publication by GPO's State Services Office was reduced by about 25%.[55] Some problems in the reviewing process remained. These involved delays by contributors in redrafting their reviewed contributions--as well as delays resulting from the field review of contributions.

5. Production Forecasts

A further improvement instituted by the NIS Committee in FY55 was the development of a production forecast.[56] To provide

long-range planning requirements and collection guidance, a 3-year

NIS Production Forecast was developed which was to be revised

annually. The Committee also designated a number of new NIS Areas

to reflect the changed political situations that had occurred in

some NIS Areas. These also provided a more efficient basis for the

NIS Maintenance Program. An attempt was made to clarify the complex

interrelationship of the basic intelligence appearing within the

various topical headings by developing an NIS Correlation Guide

which was incorporated into the NIS Standard Instructions.

Subsequently, this guide, which was found to be cumbersome and of

less value than originally anticipated, was dropped.

6. Other Refinements

During FY55, the NIS Committee became involved in a protracted

discussion of the problem of ''segmented areas.'' Throughout the

world there were various geographical entitities---subdivisions

of larger states, states within states, island groups, etc.---which

called for clarification with respect to NIS designation. In the

Far East there were two Chinas, two Koreas, two Vietnams,

and both Hong Kong and Macao; in Europe there were East and West

Germany and the Vatican in Italy; and in the Middle East there were

the minor political entities of the Arabian Peninsula. As a result

of studies in the Basic Intelligence unit in CIA, and an independent

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study in the Department of the Army, as well as the continuing

exchange of ideas within the NIS Committee, a list of new NIS Areas

was developed.[57] As approved by the Committee on 12 July 1955,

this list included a number of subareas which were to be uniformly

treated by all contributors. A feature of the list was the use of

alphabetical suffixes to distinguish various breakdowns within

larger geographic units. Thus, in the case of China, NIS 39

comprised both mainland China and Taiwan; NIS 39A covered Communist

China; and NIS 39B covered Nationalist China (Hong Kong and Macao,

originally covered in 39B, were later designated 39C).

C. Problems

Although a great deal had been accomplished in the NIS Program

by 1954, it was fully recognized that much remained to be done. In

his FY54 Annual Report, the NIS Coordinator cited three problem

areas: organizational complexity, intelligence adequacy, and

interagency support.[58]

1. Organizational Complexity

Production had been allocated to existing agencies of the

government rather than centralized in one agency. There was little

question that allocation based on dominant interests and capabilities

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was fundamental to a healthy intelligence community and in the
long run would provide better intelligence than would a centralized
capability; but the acceptance of this method of production
carried with it inherent problems of organizational complexity.
Numerous working level meetings, in addition to the meetings of
the NIS Committee, were necessary to develop mutual understanding
and a community of interest.

2. Intelligence Adequacy

Adequacy is, of course, the goal of intelligence collection
and production, and in 1954 it was realized that the goal was still
a long way off for basic intelligence. Too many important gaps
remained to be filled, and the analyses and evaluations of
available information too frequently fell short of professional
standards. Basic intelligence as published in the NIS was certainly
not alone in its shortcomings, but to those responsible for the
NIS Program it was a worrisome and heartfelt frustration.

3. Interagency Support

Interagency support of the NIS Program had to be reasonably
consistent from year to year among the participating agencies to
achieve a balanced production effort. Disruptions in the production
flow caused disproportionate setbacks through the entire

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production process (as they do today). The disruptions in the

first several years were mainly caused by uneven fiscal support

for NIS requirements and by the use of NIS capabilities for other

purposes. The NIS Coordinator recommended that a coordinated budget

for the NIS Program be established to insure that the Bureau of

the Budget was aware of the whole program and that appropriations

related to production requirements for each agency be specifically

earmarked for NIS work. Unfortunately, this was not to be realized.

D.   Gazetteer and Base Map Programs

By FY57, 111 gazetteers (including 9 revisions) had been

produced.[59]   This marked the first time that such coverage had

been achieved under one gazetteer program. Throughout FY58, the

Office of Geography substantially devoted its time to revising

the Preliminary Gazetteer on the U.S.S.R. Published in FY59, it

contained 360,000 place names and was the most comprehensive

gazetteer ever published on that country.[60]

Because of the urgency of making approved, standardized

geographic names available to NIS producing offices in the early

stages of the NIS Program, most of the gazetteers had been produced

in a preliminary form with the realization that further name

research and expansion of the gazetteers would be necessary to

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meet the requirements of the NIS Program and the Intelligence Community as a whole.

The base map program, which had been one of the bright spots in the early days of the NIS Program, began to falter in FY53 and FY54 because of a lack of personnel in the Geographic Division, CIA. The FY54 map production schedule called for the production of 18 standard base maps and 15 page-size base maps. In addition, 17 base maps carried over from the FY53 schedule were to be completed; during FY54 these maps were completed and published, but only 10 of the 33 base maps on the FY54 schedule were published. Further, the base maps that were produced were published months after the dates scheduled, which seriously disrupted production plans of the NIS contributors and caused them to default on their production commitments.[61]

E.   Production Record

Having exceeded its goal in FY53, the NIS Production Schedule for FY54 called for the equivalent of 9 complete NIS, or 541 sections.[62] At the time the schedule was established it appeared to be in line with the capabilities of the contributing agencies because the numerical requirements were approximately the same as the actual production of the previous fiscal year.

However, shortly after the start of the year the contributing

agencies found it necessary to adjust their operations under

government economy programs. Reduced appropriations required

cutbacks in personnel and realignment of capabilities which

seriously disrupted the NIS Production Plan. At first the

setback appeared serious, like that of the Korean war, but

because the procedures and machinery had been well established

and a positive attitude of cooperation had been assiduously

cultivated, the NIS Program again demonstrated its ability to

survive. At the end of the first quarter of the year the

contributing agencies had accomplished 53% of the goal for

the period. By the end of the second quarter, however, readjustments

had been initiated in most of the contributing offices, and

the goal fulfillment for the period was up to 71%. The

stabilized rate of production continued during the third quarter,

and during the final quarter of the fiscal year the effectiveness

of the adjustments made by the agencies was reflected in the

completion of a large number of sections to the final phase

of processing. This brought total production for the year to

443 sections, substantially attaining the goal of 8 equivalent

NIS per year established by the JCS.

By the end of FY54, the NIS Program had overcome many of

its early production difficulties and, although problems remained,

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it could point with pride to its accomplishments: 1) the
publication of more than 2,200 sections during the 6 years of NIS
operations, representing 40% of the total world coverage, principally
on areas of high priority as established by the JCS; 2) the
publication of NIS gazetteers, comprising more than a million
geographic names, on 72 foreign areas; and 3) the establishment
of an active maintenance program for the necessary revision of the
published NIS. Further, these published NIS were only the valuable
end product of a complex operation. Back of the published documents
were the extensive working files--the reservoirs of available basic
knowledge on all countries and areas of the world. Gaps disclosed
as a result of fulfilling NIS production requirements were immediately
made known to the field collection effort. Files which formerly
had been left untouched until a requirement was laid on were
systematically collated and summarized under the NIS Maintenance
Program.

The NIS Program was now firmly established. It was with a
feeling of confidence rather than frustration that the imperfections
could be tackled.

The buoyancy and confidence with which the NIS ended FY54
was sustained the following year. In his Annual Report for FY55,
the NIS Coordinator was able to say:

It has been a successful year of considerable accomplishments
in which the JCS annual production goal was fully attained, more
far-reaching intelligence requirements were integrated into the
NIS, and improved methods and procedures were developed to meet
the expanding rise of the NIS. It might also be characterized
as the year in which the NIS firmly established its position
as the fundamental intelligence program of the government.[63]

It was in this report that the Report to the Congress on the

Intelligence Activities of Government, prepared by a Task Force

of the Hoover Commission, could be cited:

The National Intelligence Survey is an invaluable publication
which provides the essential elements of basic intelligence on
all areas of the world. While its production involves an
extensive and expensive effort, all members of the Intelligence
Community derive an immediate benefit from the contributions
they make to it and profit from the final product. There
always will be a continuing requirement for keeping the survey
up to date.

Detracting from the excellence of the quantitative production

achievement beginning about 1955, however, was the lack of

timeliness in the submission of contributions. Many contributors

failed to adhere to the schedule during the first three-quarters

of the year, leaving nearly one-half of the year's production

outstanding at the beginning of the last quarter. This problem was

to plague Agency reviewers for many years. Obviously, a production

pattern which results in the submission of nearly one-half of a

year's scheduled production in the final quarter creates major

problems for both the contributing agencies and the reviewers in

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CIA. The review staffs in the contributing agencies are forced to work long hours under pressure to process the material to meet the yearend deadline, with the inevitable result of lowering the quality of contributions. This in turn increases the processing burden in all subsequent steps.

By the end of FY60 the NIS Program had been in operation for 12 years; during that period it had come close to achieving the goal set for it in the National Security Council Intelligence Directive that ''Basic Intelligence required in the interest of national security shall be compiled and continuously maintained in National Intelligence Surveys.'' The overall production record was impressive: more than 5,000 NIS sections had been produced, including nearly 1,000 maintenance revisions, which represented 80% of the initial worldwide coverage, with the JCS highest priority areas initially completed and in active maintenance.[64]

While those responsible for the program had cause to look back with pride, there was also cause for concern. From the buildup following the dislocations of the Korean war, NIS production consistently met the JCS requirement of 8 equivalent NIS a year--until FY60 when it fell to 7. This shortfall was the result of the continuing effect of budget and manpower reductions and diversions from NIS work in the contributing agencies. Faced with the problem of lessened production effort,

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the NIS Committee sought to establish a relatively reasonable
maintenance cycle for a number of priority areas, and topics,
as an interim phase in accomplishing the long-range NIS mission
of providing comprehensive, worldwide, onhand basic intelligence
coverage.

F.   Qualitative Control

While many serious problems had been overcome by FY54,
one remained as a continuing concern for the managers of the
NIS Program---the concern over the quality of the product.   Early
in the program an elaborate system had been devised to rate the
quality of contributor manuscript submission on a scale from I
to III (categories defined in III, B).

In FY54, 28% of the contributions received a Category I
rating, a slight decrease from the previous year; Category II
material was at about the same level of 61%; and the remaining
contributions were in Category III, a considerable increase.[65]
Some material processed during the year achieved very high qualitative
standards, and a considerable proportion of other contributions
showed improvement.   However, the gains in some contributions were
offset by continuing significant difficulties in others, as
indicated by the fact that 65 sections required approximately
50% reworking of the graphic material because of poor layout,

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poor drafting, incorrect information, or bad presentation. The
overall qualitative adequacy pattern did not, therefore, reflect
the improvement reasonably expected after some 6 years of NIS
experience. A major cause was the disruption of the NIS staff because
of economy measures which resulted in a large turnover of personnel.
Maintenance contributions in particular failed to show appreciable
improvement over the initial versions. This was attributable
chiefly to a tendency to undertake maintenance revisions of
published NIS more on the basis of the time lapse from the date
of initial publication than on the basis of significant changes
or meaningful new information.

The important fact about the qualitative adequacy at this
stage was the deep concern of those responsible for the NIS
Program. Perhaps nowhere else in the Intelligence Community was
there such an exercise of self-criticism and serious effort to
improve. But it should not be forgotten that what was appearing
in the NIS was a reflection of the state of development of U.S.
intelligence.

C. User Surveys

The NIS Committee, through continuous liaison and through
study by joint and departmental committees, long maintained

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running cognizance of the NIS requirements of both the Washington Intelligence Community and the field. Until the latter part of 1953, however, there had been no formal comprehensive survey of NIS users for the purpose of ascertaining their views in light of their experience with the NIS. In December 1953, the NIS Committee formulated a questionnaire to determine the degree to which the NIS was meeting the essential requirements of its users. It was sent out by the member agencies, and some 350 replies were received.[66] These replies came not only from users whom the NIS was primarily designed to serve but also from a large number for whom the NIS was not specifically designed but who had, nevertheless, put it to a variety of uses.

The high-level users, particularly those of the armed forces, were utilizing the NIS in connection with strategic and high-level operational planning, as a reference in their individual fields of activity, as a basis for evaluating incoming intelligence reports, as source material for briefings of various kinds, and as a general reference. These users were uniformly of the opinion that the complete NIS, adequately maintained, would continue to be useful. By far the majority believed that the immediate availability of the NIS in the event of a critical situation or a general war would be of great value.

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Users in the lower command echelons, schools, and miscellaneous
installations of the armed forces were employing the NIS for
diverse purposes according to their widely varying interests.
The most prevalent uses were as a general reference, as a research
tool in connection with training programs, and as source material
for miscellaneous briefings and intelligence publications. While a
number of these lower echelons believed that the NIS would be of
great value in the event of a critical situation, most thought
that the NIS would be of only moderate value in such circumstances.

The principal shortcomings indicated by the user survey were
the following: 1) the NIS was not being maintained on a sufficiently
current basis, 2) coverage was not being extended with sufficient
rapidity, 3) certain aspects should be treated in greater detail,
and 4) there was a need for succinct, synthesized overall area coverage.

In his analysis of the principal recommendations, the NIS
Coordinator recognized that the comprehensive nature of the NIS
permitted the intelligence to get out of date with varying degrees of
rapidity and that this problem had been recognized early in the
program, with provision made for a system to maintain the material
adequately. The maintenance program was proceeding as rapidly as
the advent of new information and production capabilities would
permit. It was obvious that NIS-type intelligence would never

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supply the up-to-the-minute detail of current intelligence, and yet

the amount of detail desired by the lower level field commands would

be impossible to achieve and would hopelessly bog down the program.

Finally, the desire for succinct, synthesized overall coverage

would be satisfied for high-level planners by the Chapter I's then

going into production.

Solicited surveys of users of intelligence tend to be too

generalized in their responses because the need of intelligence

frequently is on a contingency basis, and this is particularly

the case with basic intelligence. The 1958 Lebanon crisis,

however, offered an opportunity to assess the value of the NIS

in relation to a particular intelligence problem. A March 1959

CINCNELM report on the use of the NIS in connection with the

crisis confirmed the value of the full spectrum of NIS content

coverage and the importance of the onhand availability of the

NIS at a time of emergency.[67] The report stated that the NIS

was widely used by all commands and, for COMSIXTHFLT, constituted

the most important single source of both general and detailed

basic intelligence on the Middle East and Mediterranean areas.

Indicative of a criticism that was to become even more pronounced,

however, was a comment on the lack of adequate maintenance and a

suggestion that, in general, the NIS be comprehensively maintained

at intervals of 5 years.

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H. Maintenance

As early as 1950 the problem of maintaining the NIS on an
up-to-date basis had been a matter of continuing concern to the
managers of the NIS Program. As mentioned previously, the user
survey of 1953 indicated that this problem was one of the
shortcomings listed in replies to the questionnaire. The 1959
report on the use of the NIS in the Middle East crisis brought
increasing attention to the problem.

The Office of Basic Intelligence made a Staff Study on
Maintenance in May of 1959, which became the basis for a thorough
NIS Committee review of the problem.[68] It was urgent that the system
of maintenance be reevaluated because, although maintenance units
were approaching 50% of contributions, 422 sections produced and
dated before FY53 had not been scheduled for revision in the forecast
period through FY62. It was evident from the study that the level of
NIS production would not permit completion of the initial worldwide
coverage and concurrent maintenance on a sufficiently timely
basis to sustain the intelligence value of the published NIS.
In these circumstances, the priorities established by the JCS
appeared to leave little alternative but to concentrate on
production and maintenance of all Priority I Areas and selected
Priority II Areas, at the expense of less important Priority II

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Areas and all Priority III Areas. It was evident that this would
require the termination of production of NIS units for areas not
yet covered and also of maintenance units on the less important
areas. (The role of priorities for NIS production is inextricably
bound to the problem of maintenance or scheduling and will be
discussed more fully in Section V, I, 3.)

The program for selective maintenance was undertaken as an
interim measure with full awareness of its effect on the NIS
mission of providing comprehensive, worldwide basic intelligence
coverage. It recognized that initial coverage would be nominal,
or incomplete, for many segments of Latin America and Africa, and
that maintenance would have to be deferred on many basic topical
sections of high JCS priority. These measures for selective
maintenance would, however, provide an adequate maintenance cycle
for a substantial number of priority areas and topics. Moreover,
many published NIS units of lesser maintenance priority would
continue to provide users with basic intelligence of value even
when revisions were deferred.

The OBI analysis indicated that there were certain topical units
where fundamental circumstances had changed so little as to warrant
a deferment of maintenance. It also noted that contributor production
capabilities could be concentrated, and topical content produced,

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in a more suitable form for less developed areas by the full use
of consolidated chapters (as opposed to separately published
sections).

The Departments of Army and State responded favorably to the
OBI initiative on maintenance. Army spoke in terms of drastic
reappraisal of the maintenance concept then in effect and urged
reliance on the Chapter I Annual concept as a practical means of
restoring user confidence in the NIS. At the same time, it called
for the elimination of duplicative content and of material too
transitory to be considered basic intelligence. State offered a
detailed proposal for a system of NIS maintenance production based
upon section topic priorities, to be used in conjunction with the
JCS country priorities, with Army counterproposing an area/topic
combination priority list. Unfortunately, however, little could
be done immediately to follow through on these proposals because
of the realities of scheduling, but there was general agreement in
principle. Also, the problem of maintenance was fully appreciated
now and became the basis for the shifting emphasis in the NIS Program
that began to be noticed about 1961.

I. Miscellany

1. Comments on Principal Sources

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From the start of the NIS Program it had been the practice

to include in most NIS sections a subsection entitled ''Comments

on Principal Sources.'' This was never intended as a complete

bibliography such as those attached to the normal scholarly

textbook. Its chief purpose was to evaluate the major sources

used in the preparation of the section and, most importantly, to

indicate the gaps in intelligence as targets for the collectors

of intelligence information. Footnotes in the text regarding

sources were avoided insofar as possible.

A description of the purpose of the ''Comments'' was included

in a 1949 memorandum to NIS contributors:[69]

> The last subsection of most sections of the NIS is the one
> entitled ''Comments on Principal Sources.'' Its purpose is
> twofold: (1) To give the user of the NIS an evaluation of the
> principal sources and the credence to be attached to all elements
> of intelligence contained in the section; and (2) to give those
> concerned with the improvement of NIS intelligence, principally
> collection agencies, a clear indication of the deficiencies and
> gaps existing in available information. To these ends, it is
> required that intelligence analysts responsible for the actual
> production of the several NIS sections fully understand the
> import of this subsection.

2. Dissemination and Control of the NIS

Dissemination of the NIS involves three categories of users:

first, and most important, are the USIB agencies involved in the

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production as well as the use of the finished materials (these
and the high-level planners are the primary users for which the
NIS is produced); second, the non-USIB agencies and private
institutions, which receive copies of the NIS on a need-to-know
basis; and third, foreign governments that are authorized to
receive the NIS.

During the early years of the NIS Program, the policies
governing the release of the NIS to other than the primary users
were determined by a subcommittee for Military Information Control
(MIC) of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
(SANACC).[70] The producing agencies were responsible in each case
for determining what was releasable under the policies in force.

As the production of intelligence increased in volume, the
procedures for its control and dissemination became involved and
cumbersome; so corrective action was initiated in 1951 to clarify
and simplify the existing policies. In July 1952, Intelligence
Advisory Committee directive IAC-D-45/12 (Revised) established the
procedures for dissemination of the NIS.[71] This directive, based
on a revision of NSCID No. 1 of 28 March 1952, was submitted on
16 June of that year and then revised on the basis of proposals
submitted by G-2 and the Air Force. Part I of the directive
established the procedures and controls for dissemination of the

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NIS to foreign governments and contained a list (Tab A) of the

controlled areas on which the NIS were not releasable. Part II

of the directive governed the release of the NIS to non-IAC

government departments and agencies.

As time passed, revisions and alterations to IAC-D-45/12

(Revised) accumulated steadily and became unwieldy and confusi(b)(3) NatSecAct

By June 1958, there had been six revisions of Part I and twice

that number of Part II. Toward the end of 1958, the IAC's

successor, the newly established United States Intelligence Board

(USIB), took up the problem, and IAC-D-45/12 (Revised) was withdrawn

and replaced by USIB-D-513/3 (Final), which became effective on

2 December 1958. At the same time the USIB agreed to delete and

discontinue Part II of IAC-D-45/12 (Revised), since the basic

authority for the dissemination of NIS materials to U.S. agencies

and departments outside the Intelligence Community had been

delegated to the NIS Committee (IAC-D-45/12.7, 27 February 1956).

In accordance with the latter change, USIB-D-51.3/3 (Final) was

officially titled "Problems for Dissemination of the National

Intelligence Survey to Foreign Governments," and henceforth it was

to be the basic document for such dissemination.[72]

3. Security Classification

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From the beginning of the program the NIS textual material was classified independently by section. The Standard Instructions directed that all pages of a section uniformly carry the highest classification of material within the section.

On 23 August 1949 the NIS Chairman summarized the background of NIS classification policy:[73]

a. No classification ceiling has ever been set.

b. A standard classification of SECRET has been adopted for NIS binders, on the theory that most NIS will contain some SECRET material and that, on the other hand, little, if any, NIS will be classified higher than SECRET.

c. It has been constantly stressed that overclassification should be rigorously avoided.

d. Since most classifications may be revised downward with the passage of time, the final classification of NIS material should not be determined until the material has been finally prepared. This will tend to reduce the number of occasions on which NIS will require reclassification.

It was later found that some NIS materials required a TOP SECRET classification for a variety of reasons and were published in separate TOP SECRET Annexes.

In 1952 the Navy asked for a reexamination of the requirement that all textual pages of each NIS section be given the same security classification. Sometimes an overall classification of SECRET was applied whereas the bulk of material was CONFIDENTIAL or RESTRICTED.

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Navy proposed that subdivisions be classified according to their individual merits, in order to permit more widespread dissemination. This question of classification was taken up in the NIS Committee meeting of 15 April 1952.[74] The Vice-Chairman pointed out that:

> The NIS Section has been established as a production unit, and must carry an overall security classification. Part of several subdivisions within a section may appear on a single printed page in the published NIS, and each of these subdivisions may carry a different classification under the proposed plan. About eight manuscript pages go into the makeup of a printed page of the NIS (both sides) and the NIS is printed 16 pages to a single form. A breakdown of classification within a section would require detailed instructions to the printer and extensive review by D/B of proofs and final printed material to insure that the final product carried the proper classification. This additional burden on D/B and GPO would increase processing time and further delay publication of the NIS.

The Committee agreed to continue the present policy. This classification procedure was followed until 1967 (see Section V, I, 5).

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V. Years of Change, 1961-68

A. Institution of Emergency Measures

The Joint Staff issued a special report in January 1961 on the NIS requirements of the military establishment as determined by a detailed survey of all unified and specified commands and principal Defense components.[75] The report confirmed the need of the military establishment for early completion and accelerated maintenance of the bulk of the entire NIS Program as then constituted. It included the revised JCS Priorities for the NIS Program during the following 3 years and assigned high priority to some 70% of the NIS world areas, including 17 in Africa and 20 in Latin America. This effort to ''catch up'' on Latin American and African areas was to become more pronounced in later years, but it is noteworthy that as early as 1961 the DD/CI also questioned the scanty attention given to these areas.

The Joint Staff report added impetus to NIS Committee action to cope with the reality that production at the prevailing levels, indicated by the 1960 shortfall and the reduced 1961 schedule, did not permit concurrently the early completion of full-scale initial worldwide coverage and the accelerated maintenance of the published NIS. With USIB approval, the NIS Committee in March 1961 undertook a number of

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emergency measures to provide accelerated initial coverage and increased

priority maintenance of NIS sections with the available production

capabilities.[76] These emergency measures included suspension of

production on some 20 low-priority areas, stopgap coverage for some

30 newly emerging states and other undeveloped areas, and increased

selectivity of topics and areas scheduled for maintenance. (These

steps initiated by the NIS Committee were to be taken up again a

year later by a staff designated by the USIB, carried to their

inevitable conclusion, and dubbed a ''new look'' in the NIS Program.)

It is worth looking at what the Committee had in mind: OBI

would develop a list of published NIS on which maintenance was

indicated based on factors of age, fundamentally changed situations,

and serious gaps in coverage. Using this list, each chapter

coordinator would systematically, and in appropriate detail, assess

the validity of each published unit--such assessment to exclude

any consideration of production capabilities. Then the published

units were to be grouped according to the following categories:

a) Destruction--where continuance in active status could mislead

the user and prompt maintenance prove infeasible; b) Standard

Maintenance--a generally obsolescent section on a priority area

calling for established production and processing methods; c)

Special Maintenance--for a partly obsolescent section on a priority

area the validity of which could be restored by relatively few changes;

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and d) Maintenance Deferred. The Special Maintenance sections

called for procedural changes whereby the contributors would

submit only redrafted portions of a published NIS which would

interlace with the original and could expeditiously be processed

for submission to the Printing Services Division. The institution

of these measures set the tone and provided a framework and an

approach to NIS production that was to prevail to the present day.

B. Reallocation of Production Responsibility

1. State Withdrawal From NIS Production

The FY60 shortfall in Department of State NIS production was

but the prelude to more serious action. Pursuant to departmental

direction that his staff and function be reduced, the Director of

the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State proposed in March

1961 that State production of the NIS be terminated and be reallocated

by the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with NSCID

No. 3.[77] This State responsibility, in effect since the inception

of the NIS Program and financially supported by CIA, included production

and maintenance of the NIS in the sociological, political,

and nonbloc economic fields and constituted some 40% of the

total annual NIS production commitment. Agreement was reached

for a major portion of this responsibility to be reallocated to

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a new Research Division to be created in the Office of Basic

Intelligence, CIA, with other segments to be reallocated in

accordance with specialized capabilities to the Office of

Research and Reports, CIA. Other segments were reallocated to

the Department of Commerce and the Department of Health, Education,

and Welfare. Under a separate arrangement, the responsibility

for NIS biographic intelligence was reallocated from State to

the Office of Central Reference, CIA. State collection facilities

and consultative support were to continue to be fully available

to NIS contributors and the State Graphics Support unit was

transferred to Publication Division, OBI.

Although administrative responsibility was assumed by CIA as

of the beginning of FY62, State agreed to maintain NIS production

by the existing staff until the scheduled fall transfer to the new

CIA headquarters at Langley. During this period the Office of

Basic Intelligence was to recruit the new Research Division staff

from available State personnel with NIS experience and from other

sources. Complementary negotiations between CIA and the

Departments of Commerce and HEW were in progress at the end of FY61.

The principal task in FY62 was to recruit and organize

the staffs in CIA and the departments to take over the production

responsibilities from State.

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2. Research Division, OBI

The Office of Basic Intelligence established the new Research

Division and assumed, as an essential aspect of the reallocations,

a major role in programed research and production of a large part

of the NIS and the coordination of 12 staffs in other government

departments.[78] Special arrangements provided these staffs with

access to appropriate CIA intelligence materials and resources.

An NIS representative and his staff were established under the

Director of Intelligence and Research of the State Department as

a focal point for State collection support, for servicing State's

interest in NIS scheduling and content, and for providing advisory

NIS review and assistance.

There were further major realignments in NIS production

responsibilities during FY63. The DIA production center became

operational in implementation of DIA assumption of former NIS

production responsibilities (except for certain service-retained

units) of the individual services.[79]

Also, during FY63, the OBI Research Division, partially recruited

to produce a major portion of the former State contribution, was

transferred, in order to integrate these specialized sociological

and political research capabilities, to the Office of Current

Intelligence in CIA.[80]

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3. Non-USIB Production

Another realignment during FY61 was the DCI approval, at
the insistence of the Secretary of Labor, of the assignment of
production responsibility for nonbloc Section 44 (Manpower) of
the NIS to the Department of Labor.[81] Production responsibility
for Manpower Sections on the Sino-Soviet bloc was concurrently
assigned to the Office of Research and Reports, CIA. These and the
other reallocations from State considerably broadened the range of
U.S. Government agencies having NIS production responsibilities,
already including the Departments of Agriculture and Interior and
the Public Health Service, in addition to the USIB agencies.

C. USIB Review of the NIS Program

In FY63, the Assistant for Coordination/DCI and Staff, at USIB
request, undertook a survey of the NIS. The survey addressed itself
comprehensively to the complex aspects of the program in the context
of reaffirming, as had previous surveys, the basic mission and wide
utilization of the NIS.[82]

The subsequent report reviewed the overall community concept
with a view to revising the program. In a briefing note to the
DCI in July 1963,[83] the Coordinator of the Staff Study made

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three major suggestions for revision of the NIS Program:

    a. Realigned priority toward meeting government needs for basic-type intelligence required as a foundation for strategic and high-level planning and for development of foreign policy. .

    b. Should contain only the essential static basic intelligence determined to be specifically required for each area covered.

    c. Reliance should be placed on other departmental or interdepartmental intelligence to meet the needs for more specialized types of basic intelligence.

In August 1963 the USIB approved the recommendations for simplification of the NIS Program.[84] The major element of the USIB approval was provision for a new statement in the NIS Standard Instructions entitled ''Concept, Direction, and Management of the National Intelligence Survey Program, and Coordination with Other Programs of Basic Intelligence'' to replace the former statement on the ''Nature, Purpose, and Scope of the NIS Program'' contained in the 1959 Standard Instructions.

The major effect of this new direction for the NIS was to make the General Survey (a replacement for the former Chapter I) the predominant element in the program with selective production of the detailed topical sections. This resulted in the discontinuance of almost 50% of the separate topical units initially designed in the NIS Outlines. Additionally, greater selectivity was employed in production of the topical units.

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In FY64 the managers of the program reported considerable progress in the realigned direction.[85] In this 16th year of the NIS Program major progress was made in the USIB-approved reorientation of the NIS, and the foundation was laid for further acceleration in FY65 of NIS coverage and updating. Eighteen General Surveys were produced. This total was a 50% increase over the predecessor Chapter I and represented a transition toward the goal of 30 General Surveys in FY65. In FY64, there were 162 topical units produced, or 40% of the total production units during the year. Production of supplementary, more detailed NIS selectively decreased to 243 (compared with 330 in the previous year). For FY65, the General Surveys were planned as 55% of the total production.

    D. Streamlining the Program

        1. Concept of the General Survey

The major impetus of the ''new look'' in the NIS Program has been the concentration on the General Surveys as the primary units of NIS production. The surveys are comprehensive but concise units capable of providing full NIS coverage on some areas. In the case of more complex areas, certain topical units of basic coverage are provided when appropriate to the NIS mission.

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The NIS Committee took a number of related actions. Chapter I
(Brief) was discontinued with the initiation of the General Survey;
Chapter IX (Map and Chart Appraisal) was suspended; and Key
Personalities was terminated as an NIS unit, with the Office of
Central Reference of CIA assuming responsibility for this type of
programed biographic information.

2. NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook

Another element of the ''new look'' for the program was the
creation of an NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook.[86] Complementing
the more detailed coverage in the General Survey, the Factbook
provides interim updating of the essential basic data for about
155 countries or areas. It is prepared by components of the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, and
coordinated and published semiannually by the Office of Basic
Intelligence. A survey of major defense commands in late 1965
indicated that it was enthusiastically received by intelligence
consumers.

E. The NIS and Counterinsurgency

In response to a DIA request to CIA for intelligence support
of counterinsurgency requirements of the Joint Staff and military

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commands, the former Section 57 (Subversion) was revised and expanded in FY66 to include a broader assessment of the subversive or insurgent threat to a nation.[87] Subsequently, in specific response to USIB-approved Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) recommendations relative to intelligence on sub-Saharan Africa, schedules of NIS production on subversion and insurgency in this large area were realigned, demonstrating an NIS capability to respond to rapidly changing requirements.

F. Transfer of the Gazetteer Program

During FY68, as a result of a Bureau of the Budget task force report, research on geographic names and production responsibilities on gazetteers (funded by CIA) were transferred from the Department of the Interior to DoD.[88] CIA was to continue to finance, coordinate, schedule, and publish the gazetteers, which are still a part of the NIS Program. The production completed up to the transfer of the program brought to over 4 million the geographic names processed since the beginning of the program in 1947.[89]

G. Organizational Changes and Further Reallocations

1. Amalgamation of GRA/ORR and OBI

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At the beginning of FY66 (effective date 1 July 1965) the

Geographic Research Area (GRA) of ORR and the Office of Basic

Intelligence (OBI) were combined to establish a new Office of

Basic Intelligence with a broad mission in the field of environmental

intelligence.[90]   The title of the office was subsequently revised

to the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence (OBGI).

    2.   Reallocations and Changes

In FY67 the analytical portions of Section 23 (Weather and

Climate) were designated FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY to permit broader

dissemination of these data. Classification was retained on

information regarding meteorological organization and facilities,

which is issued as a supplement.[91]

Production responsibility for the Section 45 (Health and

Sanitation) on free world areas was reallocated from the Office

of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), CIA, to DIA and its content

broadened to meet DoD requirements.[92]   This enabled DIA to

suspend publication of its departmental Health and Sanitation

studies. OSI continued production on Communist areas with DIA

support for military medical information. This latter production

responsibility was also transferred to DIA during the next fiscal

year.[93]

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In FY67 the former NIS section covering Fuels and Power began

to be published in too parts, with DIA responsible for electric

power and CIA for fuels.[94] This provided more flexible programing

because each production unit was self-contained, depended on its

own significance to an area, and would have its own appropriate

maintenance cycle.

Plans were developed during FY68 to include in FY69 production

two pilot units: 1) Social Characteristics, consolidating into a

single volume the sociological coverage that had been provided by

three separate sections on Population (Section 41), Characteristics

of the People (Section 42), and Religion, Education, and Public

Information (Section 43); and 2) Manpower (Section 44), to be

concurrently replaced by expanded treatment in the more frequently

updated General Surveys.[95]

3. Reorganization of the Editorial Division

During FY66 steps were taken to reorganize the Editorial

Division of OBGI to reflect the added missions and functions of

the division and to respond to the changing emphasis and priorities

in the NIS Program. Reorganization of the division was proposed

in May 1966 to consolidate the existing seven branches of the

Editorial Division into three, thereby centralizing supervisory

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authority and more effectively grouping the responsibilities for
review and coordination.[96] The new branches were to be: 1)
General Survey (combining the former functions of Regional Review
and the coordinating functions of the General Survey Branch);
2) Military (combining the former Military Geography-- including
Ocean Areas, Transportation and Telecommunications, and Military
Branches); and 3) Socioeconomic (combining the former Sociological,
Political, and Economic Branches).

It was further contemplated that the more centralized
management would effect increased economies in production. The
reorganization was authorized on 25 August 1966[97] and put into
effect on 3 October 1966.

4. Elimination of the Regional Review Division

With the amalgamation of GRA/ORR and OBI in July 1965 the
former Regional Review Division was reduced to a branch.

The Regional Review Division, which had been established in 1955
from a branch of the former Basic Intelligence Division, was at that
time charged with the task of exercising overall surveillance of the
NIS from a regional, as distinct from a functional, point of
view. The division had no branches and, from its organization

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until shortly before the 1965 amalgamation, had consisted of a
chief and [ ] senior professional analysts who were responsible
for Western Europe, the Soviet bloc, the Far East, the Middle East
and Africa, and Latin America. Although it was originally
contemplated that the division would have [ ] area specialists,
the goal was never realized. The extensive experience required of
regional specialists precluded the expansion of the staff to this
desired strength. By 1965, through retirement, the division had
been reduced to [ ] professional analysts. In the 1965
amalgamation it was reduced to a branch and became a part of the
Editorial Division. Its primary function was to support the
General Survey with evaluative and review functions from a broad
area viewpoint--to complement the coordination function of the
General Survey personnel. In the 1966 reorganization of the
Editorial Division the remaining regional specialists (now reduced
to [ ] were combined with the General Survey Branch to fulfill
more closely the complementary function.

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Further retirements and transfers of regional analysts
occurred in FY66 and FY67 until the regional staff ceased to exist.

H. Budgetary Pressures

In the early 1960's the NIS Program began to feel the effect
of government economy measures, which involved budget reductions

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and a consequent loss of personnel. This effect was particularly

serious in the State Department, which, as previously noted, had

asked for termination of its production responsibility.

From the buildup of the program following the Korean war, NIS

production had consistently met JCS requirements of eight equivalent

NIS a year until FY60, when production fell to seven equivalent NIS.[98]

The shortfall resulted from the continuing budgetary and manpower

reductions and diversion from NIS work in contributing agencies.

The unhappy production situation in State had an unusually severe

impact in view of that department's significantly large production

responsibility and its progressive maintenance shortfall on

high-priority areas.

Projecting this trend into the next year's production schedule

indicated that an even greater shortfall would occur. Reduction

in any one year was not of primary concern. The major concern

was that year-in and year-out decreased average production would

affect the whole intelligence process of collection-research-production.

Every year that the cycle lost momentum meant an increasing backlog

of unfulfilled requirements. Even more important, it meant the

increased obsolescence of the thousands of sections in current use.

By FY60 (the 12th year of the program) more than 5,000 NIS sections

had been produced (including 1,000 in maintenance). This was 80%

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of the initial worldwide coverage of JCS high-priority areas which were initially complete and under active maintenance.

It was under these circumstances that the NIS Program was reoriented to provide more timely response to the demand for coordinated and onhand basic intelligence, although detailed coverage on a worldwide basis, encyclopedic in scope, would be replaced by a more selective determination of priorities.

I. Miscellany

1. Cessation of NIS Awards

In FY58 the NIS Committee had instituted NIS Commendations, which were awarded annually to NIS contributors who made outstanding contributions to the program.[99] In the NIS Committee meeting of 19 June 1963 the Chairman announced, with the agreement of the Committee, that in view of the major structural and personnel realignments in NIS production during the year, nominations for NIS Commendations would be suspended in FY63.[100]

2. Cessation of Quality Ratings

In the first years of the NIS Program a system of adequacy ratings, mentioned earlier (see Section III, B), had been used to

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evaluate NIS contributions. Each contribution was to be placed in

one of three qualitative categories. With the revamped program

underway in FY66 the system of category ratings was discontinued.

3. Priority List

The matter of priorities among NIS topics was first introduced

in the 4 November 1960 JCS Priority List. The entire military

establishment including all unified and specified commands and

major components of the DoD were queried and furnished requirements

on a topical/area basis. The priorities indicated in the requirements

list were not sufficiently discriminating, however, and provided

only a broad guide for production planning.

The USIB-D-51.1/8 of 28 August 1963 directed the NIS Committee

to streamline the program and to make periodic recommendations to the

USIB concerning priorities for NIS production. In response, the

NIS Committee expedited production of the single-volume General

Survey as the primary element of NIS coverage, discontinued

production on certain detailed sections, and submitted each year to

the USIB a recommended short-range production schedule.

On 11 April 1968 the USIB approved an NIS Coverage Plan,

developed by the NIS Committee, reflecting the committee's

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long-range production program.[101] The plan established NIS Area
priorities for General Survey maintenance and specified for
each NIS Area the supplementary topical coverage required over
and above that provided by the General Survey. By formally
designating both broad and detailed coverage required, the plan
established an orderly basis for production planning and facilitated
the efficient allocation of available resources toward meeting
priority basic intelligence needs.

Under this plan the General Survey continues to be the primary
unit of NIS coverage. The surveys on some 34 areas of high
strategic importance are to be maintained at intervals of about
3 years or less. Some 74 others are to be revised on an average of
every 4 years. No periodic revision is planned for the remaining
areas. Maintenance (or in some cases initial production) of
these is to be undertaken only as warranted by a marked change in
an area situation or in its significance to U.S. national security
interests.

Planned supplementary coverage is highly selective and is
based on the importance of the specific topic to the area, identifiable
user requirements, and availability of alternative coverage.
Maintenance cycles are to vary among topics and among areas to which
specific topics pertain, in accordance with stability of the

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subject matter and producer capabilities. Destruction notices on
out-of-date or discontinued sections have eliminated much over-age
intelligence and will continue to do so.

4. Revision of Standard Instructions

As part of a revision of the NIS Standard Instructions that
were published in March 1967, the NIS Committee revised the outline
guides for topical coverage. These guides, although adaptable to
countries of varying complexity, are designed to assist the
researchers by indicating the basic intelligence requirements
for particular units. The new outlines reflect the streamlining
of some of the NIS sections as well as the growing sophistication
of intelligence requirements.

5. Classification

In FY68 the system of classification of the NIS was
revised. The practice of assigning a classification individually
to sections, subsections, and graphics within each volume
was initiated, thus permitting a broader dissemination of material
contained in the NIS.[102]

6. EPIC

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By FY67 the printing of the NIS in the Electronic Printing for Intelligence Composition (EPIC) system was underway.[103] This system was developed jointly by CIA's Office of Computer Services, Printing Services Division, and Publication Division, OBGI. It was designed to do page composition and photocomposing from computer-prepared tape. Steps to facilitate and encourage NIS contributors to type original manuscript on tape were in process in FY67. The goal was substantial savings in time and money.

EPIC requirements were such that the Publication Division was charged with the responsibility for updating the contributor tapes after manuscript editing, thus eliminating the need for keyboarding in the Printing Services Division. Two positions were added in FY68 and placed within the Review Branch for this purpose.

7. 500th Meeting of the NIS Committee

The NIS Committee held its 500th meeting on 11 September 1968. This meeting commemorated 20 years of production of the NIS Program and 25 years of interagency and interdepartmental production of strategic basic intelligence, which had begun with the JANIS program in World War II.

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VI. Comments

One of the consistent problems in almost 20 years of NIS
production has been the inability of the contributing agencies to
meet the production schedule. This failure dates back to the first
year of the basic intelligence program in CIA (FY49), when only a
few sections (89 out of 303 scheduled) were submitted to the Basic
Intelligence unit for processing. Also involved with the failure
to meet schedules has been the consistent problem of a large backlog
of material submitted in the last quarter of the fiscal year (or
delayed into the first quarter of the next), which places a
tremendous workload on all processing facilities. Not only are
the sections submitted late, but in most cases they are rushed
through at the last minute, poorly prepared as a consequence,
and extremely difficult to bring up to the quality standards that
have always been a basic goal of the NIS Program.

The problem of late submissions arises from a number of causes.
The first and most consistent cause of failure has been the producing
agencies' overestimation of their capabilities. This stems, in
turn, from three basic causes: 1) lack of adequately qualified
personnel; 2) budgetary restrictions, which probably account to a
large extent for the poor quality of personnel; and 3) shifting of
personnel from their primary duties of NIS production to matters

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of higher priority. The solution of all three related problems is almost too obvious to state: but it requires a concentration of authority that does not currently exist.

Another constant problem has been the determination of priorities on which the NIS Production Schedule is based. For many years these were primarily determined by the JCS list of priority areas. Unfortunately, what is required for U.S. strategic responsibilities cannot (in many cases) be met within the capabilities and budget of the producing agencies. A practical solution has been sought many times but so far has not been found. Existing budgetary limitations, inadequately trained personnel, and the diversion of available personnel to tasks other than the primary one of NIS production have proved insurmountable problems. The solution is apparent—but difficult to effect.

Resource limitations, frequently revised national priorities, and constantly changing requirements have brought about a change of emphasis in the program's approach to the accomplishment of its mission as delineated by the National Security Council in 1948. The original concept of worldwide encyclopedic coverage has been modified. Basic intelligence coverage of foreign areas is provided on a timely basis in the single-volume General Survey. The ''new look'' of 1963 has also changed the concept of comprehensive

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coverage by detailed sections to a selective treatment based on the explicit need for coverage beyond that provided in the General Survey.

The years since 1945 have shown a succession of police actions, coups, revolts, antisubversion actions, undeclared wars, and limited wars, none of which have expanded into a general war situation. For fast-breaking situations of a local, transitory nature, onhand intelligence is vitally needed. Automatic data processing can be of great help in handling large volumes of data, but machine-stored data are not always retrievable in readily assimilable or usable form, since interpretation is needed. A necessary adjunct to the fund of basic data is provided by the in-being correlations and analyses of basic intelligence, readily available to all persons called upon to determine appropriate courses of action in a crisis situation. Greater speed of communication and of deployment of forces can be expected to increase the need for readily available basic intelligence and to put a premium on having multiple copies in stock and ready for immediate distribution. The NIS continues to fulfill this need.

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VII. Appendix

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B. Chronology

1943   Establishment on 27 April of the Joint Intelligence
        Study Publishing Board, which directed the publication
        of Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS), to provide
        coordinated intergovernmental basic intelligence
        during World War II.

1947   The Central Intelligence Agency was established under
        the National Security Act. Responsibility for JANIS
        was transferred to the Director of Central Intelligence
        on 1 October.

1948   On 13 January the National Security Council Intelligence
        Directive No. 3 initiated the NIS Program. In
        December the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the
        National Security Council approved the NIS Standard
        Instructions implementing the NIS Program. This
        action authorized the establishment of the interagency
        NIS Committee composed of representatives from State,
        Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA. The first meeting of
        the NIS Committee was held on 25 June.

1950   In May a plan was approved to produce a Special NIS
        series on Marine Climate and Oceanography covering
        the water areas of the world, production to be by
        Navy with assistance from Air Force.

        Under a CIA reorganization in October the Basic
        Intelligence Group, Office of Research and Estimates
        (ORE), became the Basic Intelligence Division of the
        Office of Research and Reports (ORR).

1952   In December the first Special NIS on Marine Climate
        and Oceanography was published.

1954   In July the first NIS Chapter I (Brief) was published
        on Iran.

1955   In August the Basic Intelligence Division of ORR
        became the Office of Basic Intelligence (OBI). The
        principal impetus for this change came from the
        Clark Committee of the Hoover Commission. The Clark
        Committee report stated that:

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The National Intelligence Survey is an
invaluable publication which provides
the essential elements of basic intelligence
on all areas of the world. While its
production involves an extensive and
expensive effort, all members of the
Intelligence Community derive an
immediate benefit from the contributions
they make to it, and profit from the
final product. There will always be a
continuing requirement for keeping the
Survey up-to-date.

1961   In April agreement was reached between the Department
of State and CIA to transfer State's NIS production
responsibilities to CIA. The major portion of this
responsibility (about 40% of the annual program
commitment) was assigned to a newly established
Research Division in OBI. The balance was allocated
to ORR/CIA, the Department of Commerce, and the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In
mid-1961 State's responsibility for biographic
intelligence was transferred to CIA, including
production of NIS ''Key Personalities.''

1962   The first OBI Basic Intelligence Factbook was
published in August. In December the Research
Division of OBI was abolished and some of the
functions transferred to the Office of Current
Intelligence (OCI).

1963   On 1 February the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
assumed responsibility for coordination of DoD NIS
efforts and for production of most NIS elements
heretofore produced by Army, Navy, and Air Force.

In August the U.S. Intelligence Board directed the
NIS Committee to reorient the NIS Program. The
General Survey became the primary unit of NIS coverage
and supplementary topical and area coverage was to be
produced on a highly selective basis.

In September the first General Survey (replacing
Chapter I - Brief) was published on Panama.

The production of NIS ''Key Personalities'' unit was
terminated, and responsibility for biographic coverage
was assumed by the Office of Central Reference/CIA.

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S E C R E T

SECRET

1965   The Basic Intelligence Factbook was integrated into
the NIS Program and the first issue published in May.

The Geographic Area of ORR was merged with OBI on
1 July.

The NIS Committee agreed to produce a more comprehensive
unit on Subversion and Insurgency based on high-level
counterinsurgency requirements by the Department of
Defense.   (b)(1)
                                         (b)(3) NatSecAct

1966   After several years of research and development, the
first NIS utilizing the Electronic Printing for
Intelligence Composition (EPIC) system was published
on 16 September

1967   The first unclassified NIS element was published in
November   (b)(1)
                                         (b)(3) NatSecAct

1968   In April the NIS Coverage Plan was approved by USIB.
It established priorities for General Survey
maintenance and specified supplementary topical and
area coverage required.

The NIS Committee held its 500th meeting on
11 September.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

OTHER AGENCIES

USIB

C. Organization and Flow Chart, NIS

NIS COMMITTEE

DIA	ARMY
STATE	NAVY
CIA	AIR FORCE

POLICY-REQUIREMENTS -SCHEDULES

DIA
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY
TRANSPORTATION &
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
HEALTH
ELECTRIC POWER
ARMED FORCES
OCEANOGRAPHY

ARMY
SCIENTIFIC
GAZETTEERS

NAVY
MERCHANT MARINE
OCEANOGRAPHY
SCIENTIFIC

INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION

AIR FORCE
AIR FACILITIES
SCIENTIFIC

STATE
(ADVISORY SUPPORT)
SOCIOLOGICAL
POLITICAL
ECONOMIC

OFFICE OF BASIC AND GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATION, RESEARCH, & PRODUCTION

SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW   PUBLICATION

MAPS & GRAPHICS   DISSEMINATION

AGRICULTURE
AGRICULTURE
FOREST PRODUCTS

COMMERCE
TRADE & FINANCE
MANUFACTURING

INTERIOR
FUELS
MINERALS & METALS
FISHERIES

LABOR
MANPOWER

CENSUS
CULTURAL ASPECTS
POPULATION

SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
(COORDINATION)

OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
SCIENTIFIC

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
ECONOMIC

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SOCIOLOGICAL
POLITICAL
SUBVERSION & INSURGENCY

DDP
CI STAFF
INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY

OFFICE OF LOGISTICS
PRINTING

CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE
DISSEMINATION

CIA OFFICES

DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLISHED NIS

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CONFIDENTIAL

PD/BGI

D. Photos

CHAIRMEN OF THE
NIS COMMITTEE

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

James A. Brammell
1965 –

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Kenneth A. Knowles
1948 – 1962

Philip G. Bower
1962 – 1965

Secret

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Secret